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Abstract
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by consid-
ering several manipulative actions as well as several “desirable” manipulation goals.
For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a
stable solution, and this may be achieved by the manipulative action of reordering
some agents’ preference lists. We present a comprehensive study of the computational
complexity of all problems arising in this way. We find several polynomial-time solv-
able cases as well as NP-hard ones. For the NP-hard cases, focusing on the natural
parameter “budget” (that is, the number of manipulative actions), we also perform a
parameterized complexity analysis and encounter parameterized hardness results.
Keywords— Stable matching, Matching markets, Manipulation, Strategic behavior,
Polynomial-time algorithms, and Parameterized hardness.
1 Introduction
In the Stable Marriage problem, we have two sets of agents, each agent has preferences
over all agents from the other set, and the goal is to find a matching between agents of
the one set and agents of the other set such that no two agents prefer each other to their
assigned partners.
Looking at applications of stable marriages and corresponding generalizations in the
context of matching markets, we evidence external manipulations in modern applications.
For instance, surveys reported that in college admission systems in China, Bulgaria,
Moldova, and Serbia, bribes have been performed in order to gain desirable admissions [11,
16]. Focusing on the most basic scenario with the same number of agents on both sides
and a one-to-one assignment, that is, Stable Marriage, we initiate a thorough study of
manipulative actions (bribery and control) from a computational complexity perspective.
Notably, bribery scenarios have also been used as motivation in other papers around
Stable Marriage, e.g., when finding robust stable matchings [2] or when studying
strongly stable matchings in the Hospitals/Residents problem with ties [13].
External manipulation may have many faces such as deleting agents, adding agents,
or changing agents’ preference lists. We consider three different manipulation goals and
five different manipulative actions.
We introduce the manipulation goals Constructive-Exists, Exact-Exists, and Exact-
Unique, where Constructive-Exists is the least restrictive goal and asks for modifications
such that a desired agent pair is contained in some stable matching. More restrictively,
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Exact-Exists asks for modifications such that a desired matching is stable. Most restric-
tive, Exact-Unique requires that a desired matching becomes the only stable matching.
As manipulative actions, we investigate Swap, Reorder, DeleteAcceptability , Delete,
and Add. The actions Swap and Reorder model bribery through an external agent. While
a single Reorder action allows to completely change the preferences of an agent (modeling
a briber who can “buy an agent”), a Swap action is more fine-granular and only allows to
swap two neighboring agents in some agent’s preference list (modeling a briber who has
to slightly convince agents with increasing costs/effort). For both actions, the external
agent might actually change the true preferences of the influenced agent, for example,
by advertising some possible partner. However, in settings where the agents’ preferences
serve as an input for a centralized mechanism computing a stable matching which is
subsequently implemented and cannot be changed, it is enough to bribe the agents to
cast untruthful preferences. Delete and Add model control of the instance. They are
useful to model an external agent, i.e. the organizer of some matching system, with
the power to accept or reject agents to participate or to change the participation rules.
While a Delete (resp. Add) action allows to delete (resp. add) an agent to the instance,
a DeleteAcceptability action forbids for a specific pair of agents the possibility to be
matched to each other and to be blocking. The latter can be seen as a hybrid between
bribery and control because it can model an external agent that changes acceptability
rules (for example introducing a maximum age gap) as well as it can model a briber who
convinces an agent about inacceptability of some other agent at some cost. Note that
we do not consider the actions Delete and Add in the Exact-Exists and Exact-Unique
setting, as these two actions cannot be applied to the natural definitions of these two
goals.
Related Work. Since its introduction [9], Stable Marriage has been intensely stud-
ied by researchers from different disciplines and in many contexts [10, 15, 20].
One topic related to manipulation in stable marriages is the study of strategic be-
havior, which focuses on the question whether agents can misreport their preferences to
fool a given matching algorithm to match them to a better partner. Numerous papers
have addressed the question of strategic behavior for different variants of computing sta-
ble matchings, matching algorithms, types of agents’ preferences and restrictions on the
agents that are allowed to misreport their preferences (e.g., [9, 22, 23, 25]; see [20, Chap-
ter 2.9] for a survey). This setting is related to ours in the sense that the preferences of
agents are modified to achieve a desired outcome, while it is fundamentally different with
respect to the allowed modifications and their goal: In the context of strategic behavior
an agent is only willing to change her preferences if she directly benefits from it.
While we are interested in finding ways to influence a profile to change the set of
stable matchings, finding robust stable matchings [2, 17, 18] corresponds to finding stable
matchings such that a briber cannot easily make the matching unstable. For instance,
Chen et al. [2] introduced the concept of d-robustness: A matching is d-robust if it is
stable in the given instance and remains stable even if d arbitrary swaps in preference
lists are performed.
Conceptually, our work is closely related to the study of bribery and control in elections
(see [6] for a survey). In election control problems [1], the goal is to change the structure
of a given election, e.g., by modifying the candidate or voter set, such that a designated
candidate becomes the winner/looser of the resulting election. In bribery problems [5],
the briber is allowed to modify the votes in the election to achieve the goal. Most of the
manipulative actions we consider are inspired by either some control operation or bribery
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Action/Goal Constructive-Exists Exact-Exists Exact-Unique
Swap W[1]-h. wrt. ` (Th. 2) P (Th. 6) NP-c. (Pr. 2)
Reorder W[1]-h. wrt. ` (Th. 2) P (Pr. 3) W[2]-h. wrt. ` (Th. 4)
2-approx in P (Pr. 1)
Delete W[1]-h. wrt. ` (Th. 2) P (Ob. 1) P (Th. 5)
Accept.
Delete P (Th. 3) − −
Add W[1]-h. wrt. ` (Th. 1) − −
NP-h. even if ` =∞ (Th. 1)
Table 1: Overview of our results, where ` denotes the given budget. All stated W[1]- and
W[2]-hardness results also imply NP-hardness.
action already studied in the context of voting.
Our manipulation goals are also related to problems previously studied in the stable
matching literature: For example, the Constructive-Exists problem with given budget
zero reduces to the Stable Marriage with Forced Pairs problem, which aims at
finding a stable matching in a given Stable Marriage instance that includes some
given agent pairs. While the problem is polynomial-time solvable for Stable Marriage
instances without ties [20], deciding the existence of a “weakly stable” matching is NP-
hard if ties are allowed even if only one pair is forced [19]. This directly implies hardness
of the Constructive-Exists problem if ties are allowed even if the budget is zero.
Our Contributions. Providing a complete P vs. NP dichotomy, we settle the compu-
tational complexity of all computational problems emanating from our manipulation sce-
narios. We also conduct a parameterized complexity analysis of these problems using the
parameter budget `, that is, the number of elementary manipulative actions that we are
allowed to perform. Table 1 gives an overview of our results. Additionally, we prove that
Constructive-Exists-Swap does not admit an O(n1−)-approximation in f(`)nO(1)
time for any  > 0 unless FPT=W[1]. Furthermore, for all problems we observe XP-
algorithms with respect to the parameter `. The Constructive-Exists-Reorder and
Exact-Unique-Reorder problem require non-trivial algorithms to show this (see Ap-
pendix D).
Comparing the results for the different combinations of manipulation goals and ma-
nipulative actions, we observe a quite diverse complexity landscape: While for all other
manipulative actions the corresponding problems are computationally hard, Construc-
tive-Exists-Delete and Exact-Unique-DeleteAcceptability are polynomial-time
solvable. Relating the different manipulation goals to each other, we show that specifying
a full matching that should be made stable instead of just one agent pair that should be
part of some stable matching makes the problem of finding a successful manipulation sig-
nificantly easier. In contrast to this, providing even more information about the resulting
instance by requiring that the given matching is the unique stable matching instead of
just one of the stable matchings makes the problem of finding a successful manipulation
again harder.
We defer the proofs of several results (marked by ?) and some details to the appendix.
3
2 Preliminaries
Parameterized Complexity. A parameterized problem consists of a problem in-
stance I and a parameter value k (in our case the budget `). It is called fixed-parameter
tractable with respect to k if there exists an FPT-algorithm, i.e., an algorithm running
in time f(k)|I|O(1) for a computable function f . Moreover, it lies in XP with respect to
k if it can be solved in |I|f(k) for some computable function f . There is also a theory
of hardness of parameterized problems that includes the notion of W[t]-hardness with
W[t] ⊆ W[t′] for t ≤ t′. If a problem is W[t]-hard for a given parameter for any t ≥ 1,
then it is widely believed not to be fixed-parameter tractable for this parameter.
Stable Marriage. An instance I of the Stable Marriage (SM) problem consists of
a set U = {m1, . . .mn} of men and a set W = {w1, . . . , wn} of women, together with a
strict preference list Pa for each a ∈ U ∪W . We call the elements from U ∪W agents
and denote as A = U ∪W the set of agents. The preference list Pa of an agent a is a
strict order over the agents of the opposite gender. We denote the preference list of an
agent a ∈ A by a : a1  a2  a3  . . . , where a1 is a’s most preferred agent, a2 is a’s
second most preferred agent, and so on. For the sake of readability, we sometimes only
specify parts of the agents’ preference relation and end the preferences with “ (rest). . . ”. In
this case, it is possible to complete the given profile by adding the remaining agents in
an arbitrary order. We say that a prefers a′ to a′′ if a ranks a′ above a′′ in her preference
list, i.e., a′  a′′. For two agents a, a′ ∈ A of opposite gender, let rank(a, a′) denote the
rank of a′ in the preference relation of a, i.e., one plus the number of agents a prefers
to a′.
A matching M is a subset of U ×W such that each agent is contained in at most
one pair. An agent is unassigned in a matching if no pair contains this agent. For a
matching M and an assigned agent a ∈ A, we denote by M(a) the agent a is matched to
in M , i.e., M(a) = w if (a,w) ∈ M and M(a) = m if (m, a) ∈ M . We slightly abuse
notation and write a ∈M for an agent a if there exists some agent a′ such that (a, a′) ∈
M . A matching is called complete if no agent is unassigned. For a matching M , a
pair (m,w) ∈ U ×W is blocking if both m is unassigned or prefers w to M(m), and w is
unassigned or prefers m to M(w). A matching is stable if it does not admit a blocking
pair. We denote as MI the set of stable matchings in an SM instance I.
The Stable Marriage with Incomplete Lists (SMI) problem is a generalization
of the Stable Marriage problem where each agent a is allowed to specify incomplete
preferences of agents of the opposite gender and a pair of agents (m,w) ∈ U ×W can
only be part of a stable matching M if they both appear in each others preference list.
Let ma(M) denote the set of agents matched in a stable matching M . Moreover, for
an SMI instance I, let ma(I) denote the set of agents that are matched in a stable
matching in I. Note that by the Rural Hospitals Theorem [24] it holds for all stable
matchings M,M ′ ∈MI that: ma(I) = ma(M) = ma(M ′).
Manipulative Actions. We introduce five different manipulative actions and necessary
notation. We denote by X ∈ {Swap,Reorder,DeleteAcceptability,Delete,Add} the type
of a manipulative action.
Swap A Swap operation changes the order of two neighboring agents in the preference
list of an agent.
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Reorder A Reorder operation of an agent’s preference list reorders her preferences ar-
bitrarily, i.e., one performs an arbitrary permutation.
Delete Acceptability A DeleteAcceptability operation is understood as deleting the
mutual acceptability of a man and a woman. This enforces that such a deleted pair
cannot be part of any stable matching and cannot be a blocking pair for any stable
matching. Thus, after applying a DeleteAcceptability action, the given SM instance
is transformed into an SMI instance.
Delete A Delete operation deletes an agent from the instance and thereby also this agent
from the preferences of all remaining agents. Slightly abusing notation for an SM
instance I = (U,W,P) and a subset of agents A′ ⊆ A, we write I \A′ to denote the
instance I ′ that results from deleting the agents A′ in I.
Add An Add operation adds an agent from a predefined set of agents to the instance.
Formally, the input for a computational problem considering the manipulative action
Add consists of an SM instance (U,W,P) together with two subsets Uadd ⊆ U
and Wadd ⊆ W . Uadd and Wadd contain agents that can be added to the instance.
All other men Uorig := U \Uadd and women Worig := W \Wadd are part of the original
instance. Adding a set of agents XA = XU ∪XW with XU ⊆ Uadd and XW ⊆Worig
results in the instance (Uorig ∪XU ,Worig ∪XW ,P ′), where P ′ is the restriction of P
to agents from Uorig ∪XU ∪Worig ∪XW .
It is possible to model some of the manipulative actions by some other actions with
the help of adjustments and extensions in the considered Stable Marriage instance.
We present a list of these relationships between different manipulative actions on a rather
intuitive level in Appendix E.
Manipulation goals. In the Constructive-Exists setting, the goal is to mod-
ify a given SM instance using manipulative actions of some given type such
that a designated man-woman pair is part of some stable matching. For X ∈
{Swap,DeleteAcceptability,Delete,Add}, the formal definition of the problem is pre-
sented below. For the manipulative action Reorder, we adapt the definition and forbid to
reorder the preferences of m∗ and w∗, as otherwise there always exists a trivial solution
by reordering the preferences of both m∗ and w∗.
Input: Given an SM instance I = (U,W,P), a man-woman pair (m∗, w∗), and
a budget ` ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to perform ` manipulative actions of type X such that
(m∗, w∗) is part of at least one matching that is stable in the altered
instance?
Constructive-Exists-X
In the Exact setting, in contrast to the Constructive setting, we are given a complete
matching. Within this setting, we consider two different computational problems. First,
we consider the Exact-Exists problem where the goal is to modify a given SM instance
such that the given matching is stable in the instance. Second, we consider the Exact-
Unique problem where the goal is to modify a given SM instance such that the given
matching is the unique stable matching.
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Input: Given an SM instance I = (U,W,P), a complete matching M∗, and
budget ` ∈ N.
Question: Is it possible to perform ` manipulative actions of type X such that M∗
is a (the unique) stable matching in the altered instance?
Exact-Exists (Unique)-X
There also exist natural optimization variants of all considered decision problems
which ask for the minimal number of manipulative actions that are necessary to alter a
given SM instance to achieve the specified goal.
3 Constructive-Exists
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of Constructive-Exists-X .
We start with showing intractability for X ∈ {Add, Swap, DeleteAcceptability , Reorder}.
Subsequently, we show that Constructive-Exists-Delete is solvable in O(n2) time,
and Constructive-Exists-Reorder admits a 2-approximation in the same time.
3.1 A Framework for Computational Hardness
All W[1]-hardness results essentially follow from the same basic idea for a parameterized
reduction. We explain the general framework of the reduction, using the manipulative
action Add as an example. The necessary modifications for the manipulative actions
Swap, DeleteAcceptability , and Reorder are described in the appendix.
We construct a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-hard Clique problem [3],
where given an undirected graph G and an integer k, the question is whether G admits
a size-k clique, i.e., a set of k vertices that are pairwise adjacent. Fix an instance (G, k)
of Clique and denote the set of vertices by V (G) = {v1, . . . , vn} and the set of edges
by E(G) = {e1, . . . , em}. Let dv denote the degree of vertex v. Moreover, let ev1 . . . evdv be
a list of all edges incident to v.
The high-level approach works as follows. We start by introducing two agents m∗
and w∗, and the edge (m∗, w∗) is the edge which shall be contained in a stable match-
ing. Furthermore, we add q :=
(
k
2
)
women w†1, . . . , w
†
q, which we call penalizing women.
The idea is that m∗ prefers all penalizing women to w∗, and thereby, a stable matching
containing the edge (m∗, w∗) can only exist if all penalizing women w†j are matched to
agents they prefer to m∗, as otherwise (m∗, w†j) would be a blocking pair for any matching
containing (m∗, w∗).
In addition, we introduce one vertex gadget for every vertex and one edge gadget
for every edge, which differ for the different manipulative actions. Each vertex gadget
includes a vertex woman and each edge gadget an edge man: A penalizing woman can
only be matched to an edge man. However, an edge man can only be matched to a
penalizing woman if the gadgets corresponding to the endpoints of the edge and the
gadget corresponding to the edge itself are manipulated. Thus, a budget of ` = k +
(
k
2
)
suffices if and only if G contains a clique of size k.
We implement the ideas of the general approach for the manipulative action Add. For
each vertex v ∈ V , we introduce a vertex gadget consisting of one vertex woman wv and
two men m′v and mv. For each edge e ∈ E, we introduce an edge gadget consisting of an
edge man me and one man m
′
e and one woman we. Additionally, we introduce a set of k
women w˜1, . . . , w˜k. The agents that can be added are Uadd := {mv : v ∈ V }∪{m′e : e ∈ E}
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wu
w†i
mu
m′u me m′ewe
w˜t
m∗
w∗
dv + 21
1
1
1 2 1 1j + 1 2
i+ 3
p
t+ 1q
i m+ 1
k + 2
q
q + 1n+ 1
Figure 1: A vertex gadget and an edge gadget for the hardness reduction for Add, where
e = euj = ep and u = vq. The squared vertices are the vertices from Uadd that can be
added to the instance. For each i ∈ [q] (resp. t ∈ [k]), we only exemplarily show one w†i
(resp. w˜t). For an edge {x, y}, the number on this edge closer to x indicates the rank of y
in x’s preferences.
and Wadd =: ∅, while all other agents are part of the original instance. We set ` := k+
(
k
2
)
.
However, we also show that the reduction holds even if ` = ∞. The preferences of the
agents are as follows:
mv : wv  (rest). . . , m′v : wv  w˜1  · · ·  w˜k  w∗ (rest). . . ,
wv : mv  mev1  · · ·  mevdv  m
′
v  (rest). . . , we : m′e  me (rest). . . ,
me : we  wu  wv  w†1  · · ·  w†q 
(rest)
. . . , m′e : we (rest). . . ,
w†i : me1  · · ·  mem  m∗
(rest)
. . . , w˜i : m
′
v1  · · ·  m′vn 
(rest)
. . . ,
m∗ : w†1  · · ·  w†q  w∗
(rest)
. . . , w∗ : m′v1  · · ·  m′vn  m∗
(rest)
. . . .
Note that in addition to all penalizing women also all men m′v need to be matched to
agents which they prefer to w∗, as otherwise every matching containing (m∗, w∗) is blocked
by (m′v, w∗). This ensures that at most k men mv can be added to the instance, as there
exist only k women w˜i that can be matched to some m
′
v from a manipulated vertex gadget.
A visualization of parts of the construction is depicted in Figure 1.
Lemma 1. If there exists a set XA of agents (no matter of which size) such that after
their addition there exists a stable matching containing (m∗, w∗), then G contains a clique
of size k.
Proof. Let M be a stable matching containing (m∗, w∗). Since the edges (m∗, w†i ) are not
blocking, all penalizing women are matched to an edge man me for some e ∈ E. This
requires that m′e ∈ XA, as otherwise (me, we) is a blocking pair. Moreover, for each such
edge e = {u, v}, the vertex women wu and wv have to be either matched to other edge
men or to the men mu or mv. Note that in both cases, the corresponding agents m
′
u
and m′v are matched to one of the women w˜i, as otherwise (m′u, w∗) or (m′v, w∗) is a
blocking pair. Thus, there exist at most k vertices v ∈ V where wv is matched to an edge
men or to mv.
Since there are
(
k
2
)
penalizing women, and each of them is matched to an edge man,
it follows that those k vertices form a clique in G, and these edge men correspond to the
edges in the clique.
The reverse direction is shown in Lemma 3 in the appendix. We conclude that there exists
a parameterized reduction from Clique parameterized by k to Constructive-Exists-
Add parameterized by `:
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Theorem 1. Parameterized by budget `, it is W[1]-hard to decide whether
Constructive-Exists-Add has a solution with at most ` additions or has no solu-
tion with an arbitrary number of additions, even if we are only allowed to add agents of
one gender.
It is also possible to implement the general approach described above for the manipu-
lative actions Reorder, DeleteAcceptability , and Swap to show hardness for the respective
problems.
Theorem 2 (?). Constructive-Exists-Reorder and Constructive-Exists-
DeleteAcceptability are W[1]-hard parameterized by budget `.
Unless FPT = W[1], Constructive-Exists-Swap does not admit an O(n1−)-
approximation in f(`)nO(1) time for any  > 0.
3.2 Polynomial-Time Algorithms
In sharp contrast to the hardness results for all other considered manipulative actions,
there is a simple algorithm solving a given instance Idel of Constructive-Exists-
Delete consisting of an SM instance I together with a man-woman pair (m∗, w∗) in
linear time in the size of the input. The algorithm is based on the following observation.
Let W ∗ be the set of women preferred by m∗ to w∗, and U∗ the set of men preferred
by w∗ to m∗. In all stable matchings M including (m∗, w∗), every woman in W ∗ needs
to be matched to a man which she prefers to m∗, or needs to be deleted. Analogously,
every man in U∗ needs to be matched to a woman which he prefers to w∗, or needs to
be deleted. Consequently, all pairs consisting of an agent a ∈ U∗ ∪ W ∗ and an agent
a′ which a does not prefer over w∗ or m∗ cannot be part of any stable matching. This
observation motivates a transformation of the given SM instance I into a SMI instance
I ′ through the deletion of all such pairs. We also delete w∗ and m∗ from I ′ and compute
a stable matching M in the resulting instance.
Let A′ be the set of agents from U∗ ∪W ∗ which are unassigned in M . We claim that
deleting A′ is indeed a minimum number of agents to delete such that (m∗, w∗) is part
of a stable matching in I. To show this, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (?). Let I ′ be an SMI instance and a ∈ A some agent. Then, there exists
at most one agent a′ ∈ A who was unassigned in I ′, i.e., a′ /∈ ma(I ′), and is matched
in I ′ \ {a}, i.e., a′ ∈ ma(I ′ \ {a}).
Using Lemma 2, we can now show the correctness of the algorithm.
Theorem 3. Constructive-Exists-Delete is solvable in O(n2) time.
Proof. Since a stable matching in an SMI instance can be computed in O(n2) time [9],
the set A′ clearly can be computed in O(n2). We claim that Idel is a YES-instance if and
only if |A′| ≤ `.
First assume |A′| ≤ `. Let M ′ be a stable matching in I ′. We add (m∗, w∗) to M ′,
and claim that this is a stable matching in I \A′, showing that I is a YES-instance. For
the sake of a contradiction, assume that there exists a blocking pair (m,w). Since this is
not a blocking pair in I ′ \A′, it contains an agent a from (U∗∪W ∗)\A′, and a prefers w∗
over w if a = m or m∗ over m if a = w, without loss of generality, let a = m. However,
as m is matched in M ′, he prefers M ′(m) = M(m) to w∗. Thus, m prefers M(m) over w,
a contradiction to (m,w) being blocking for M .
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Now assume that |A′| > `. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists a
set of agents B′ = {b1, . . . , bk} with k ≤ ` such that I \ B′ admits a stable matching M
containing (m∗, w∗). For each i ∈ [k], let Mi be a stable matching in I ′ \ {b1, . . . , bi}.
By the definition of A′, all agents from A′ are unassigned in M0. Note that each agent
a ∈ A′ ⊆ A∗ is either part of B′ or prefers M(a) over m∗ or w∗ due to the stability of M ;
in particular, a is matched in M . Since k ≤ ` < |A′|, there exists an i such that there exist
two agents a, a′ ∈ A′ which are unassigned in Mi−1 and not contained in {b1, . . . , bi−1}
but matched in Mi or contained in {b1, . . . bi}.
From Lemma 2 it follows that it is not possible that both a and a′ are unassigned
in Mi−1 but matched in Mi. Consequently, without loss of generality it needs to hold
that a = bi, and a
′ ∈ ma(I \ {b1, . . . bi}) \ ma(I \ {b1, . . . bi−1}). However, by deleting
an agent that was previously unassigned, the set of matched agents does not change,
i.e., ma(I \ {b1, . . . bi−1}) = ma(I \ {b1, . . . bi}), since a matching that is stable in I \
{b1, . . . bi−1} is also stable in ma(I \{b1, . . . bi}), as by deleting unassigned agents it is not
possible to create new blocking pairs. This contradicts a′ ∈ ma(I \ {b1, . . . bi}) \ma(I \
{b1, . . . bi−1}).
Using the same ideas (but observing that one Reorder operation can make only two
previously unassigned agents assigned), we get a 2-approximation for Reorder.
Proposition 1 (?). One can compute a factor-2 approximation of the optimization ver-
sion of Constructive-Exists-Reorder in O(n2) time.
4 Exact-Exists
In this section, we deal with the problem of making a given matching in an SM instance
stable by performing Swap, Reorder, or DeleteAcceptability actions. In fact, it turns
out that specifying the full matching instead of one pair makes the problem easier, as for
all manipulative actions for which we showed hardness in the previous section, Exact-
Exists-X becomes polynomial-time solvable. The intuitive reason for this difference is
that the problem of making a given matching M∗ stable reduces to “resolving” all blocking
pairs for M∗. We only briefly describe the main ideas here and and refer to Appendix B
for details.
For DeleteAcceptability , this task is straightforward, as it is always optimal to delete
the acceptability of all blocking pairs. For Reorder, it is possible to delete all blocking
pairs involving some agent a at cost one, as it possible to reorder the preferences of a such
that M∗(a) becomes her top-choice. Therefore, to find an optimal solution, it is necessary
to find a minimal subset of agents that covers all blocking pairs. This reduces to finding a
vertex cover in a bipartite graph where we introduce for each agent a vertex and connect
two vertices if the corresponding agents form a blocking pair.
For Swap, the cost of resolving the blocking pair (m,w) by modifying the preferences
of m, and symmetrically for w, is the number of swaps needed to swap M∗(m) with w.
However, by resolving some blocking pair involving an agent, also other blocking pairs
involving this agent may be resolved. Thereby, the “true” costs of resolving a pair are
difficult to compute, and a more involved approach is needed to determine which of the
two agents involved in a blocking pair should be manipulated to resolve it. However, it
turns out that this problem can be reduced to an instance of the Minimum Cut problem,
proving that Exact-Exists-Swap can be solved in O(n3) time.
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Figure 2: Example of the hardness reduction from Theorem 4 for the Hitting Set
instance Z = {1, 2, 3}, F = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2}}.
5 Exact-Unique
Now, we turn from the task of making a given matching stable to the task of making it the
unique stable matching. We show that this change makes the considered computational
problems significantly more demanding in the sense that the Exact-Unique question is
W[2]-hard with respect to ` for Reorder and NP-complete for Swap. In contrast, the
problem for DeleteAcceptability is still solvable in polynomial time.
The W[2]-hardness result for the manipulative action Reorder and the NP-
completeness of Swap both follow from the same parameterized reduction from the W[2]-
complete Hitting Set problem [3] with small modifications. In an instance of Hitting
Set, we are given a universe Z, a family F = {F1, . . . , Fp} of subsets of Z, and an inte-
ger k, and the task is to decide whether there exists a hitting set of size k, i.e., a set X ⊆ Z
with |X| ≤ k and X ∩ F 6= ∅ for all F ∈ F . The general idea of the construction is to
add, for each set F ∈ F , a set gadget consisting of two men and two women, and, for each
element z ∈ Z, an element gadget consisting of a man-woman pair. We connect all set
gadgets to the element gadgets corresponding to the elements in the set. The preferences
are constructed in a way such that in each set gadget where none of the connected ele-
ment gadgets are manipulated, the two women can switch their partners and the resulting
matching is still stable given that M∗ is stable. In contrast, when a connected element
gadget is manipulated, then this switch is blocked and M∗ is the unique stable matching
in this gadget. Thereby, the manipulated element-gadgets form a hitting set. Note
that in the following reduction, rather unintuitively, we manipulate agents to rank their
partner in M∗ lower to make M∗ the unique stable matching.
Theorem 4. Exact-Unique-Reorder parameterized by ` is W[2]-hard, even if the
given matching M∗ is already stable in the original instance and we are only allowed to
modify the preferences of agents of one gender.
Proof sketch. We give a parameterized reduction from Hitting Set, which is known to
be W[2]-complete parameterized by the solution size k [3]. For each element z ∈ Z, we
add a man mz and a woman wz, which are the first choices of each other. For each
set F = {z1, . . . , zq} ∈ F , we add two men m1F and m2F and two women w1F and w2F with
the following preferences:
m1F : w
1
F  wz1  wz2  · · ·  wzq  w2F  (rest). . . , m2F : w2F  w1F  (rest). . . ,
w1F : m
2
F  m1F  (rest). . . , w2F : m1F  m2F  (rest). . . .
We set M∗ := {(mz, wz) : z ∈ Z}∪{(m1F , w1F ), (m2F , w2F ) : F ∈ F} to be the man-optimal
matching, and ` := k (see Figure 2 for a visualization).
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Let X = {z1, . . . , zk} be a hitting set in the given instance. We claim that M∗ becomes
the unique stable matching after modifying, for all z ∈ X, the preferences of wz to be the
following: m1F1  m1F2  · · ·  m1Fp  mz 
(rest)
. . . .
Conversely, let S be the set of agents whose preferences have been modified. We claim
that a set X, consisting of element z for each agent mz or wz in S and an arbitrary
element z ∈ F for each agent miF or wiF in S, is a solution to the given Hitting Set
instance.
It is possible to adapt the reduction from the previous theorem to prove hardness for
the manipulative action Swap. Here, we utilize the fact that Reorder operations can be
modeled by (up to n2 + n) Swap operations. To do so, we adapt the reduction such that
it is only possible to modify the preferences of women wz and add an “activation cost”
to modifying the preferences of wz such that only the preferences of a fixed number of
women can be modified but for these we can modify them arbitrarily.
Proposition 2 (?). Exact-Unique-Swap is NP-complete, even if the given match-
ing M∗ is already stable in the original instance and we are only allowed to modify the
preferences of agents of one gender.
In contrast to the hardness results for the other two manipulative actions, Exact-
Unique-DeleteAcceptability is solvable in polynomial time. On an intuitive level,
one reason for this is that it is not possible to manipulate whether an agent a ranks some
other agent a′ above or below M∗(a).
The polynomial-time algorithm for Exact-Unique-DeleteAcceptability uses the
theory of rotations, which we briefly recap. In a stable matching M , for a man m ∈ U ,
let sM (m) denote the first woman w succeeding M(m) in m’s preference list that prefers m
to M(w). If no such woman exists, then we set sM (m) := ∅. A rotation exposed in a stable
matching M is a sequence ρ = (mi0 , wj0), . . . , (mir−1 , wjr−1) such that for each k ∈ [0, r−1]
it holds that (mik , wjk) ∈M and wjk+1 = sM (mik), where additions are taken modulo r.
We call such a rotation a man-rotation and sM (m) the rotation successor of m. We
define sW (w) for w ∈ W analogously and call a rotation where the roles of men and
women are switched woman-rotation. As a matching is unique if and only if it exposes
neither a man-rotation nor a woman-rotation [10], it is possible to reformulate the goal of
Exact-Unique-DeleteAcceptability: Modify the given SM instance by deleting the
acceptability of at most ` pairs such that neither a man-rotation nor a woman-rotation is
exposed in M∗.
First of all, note that it is possible to solve the problems of removing all man-rotations
exposed in M∗ and the problem of removing all woman-rotations separately. To remove
man-rotations, we only delete the acceptability of pairs (m,w) where m prefers M∗(m)
to w and w prefers m to M∗(w). For woman-rotations, the situation is symmetric.
We solve both problems by reducing them to the Minimum Weight Spanning Anti-
Arborescence problem, which can be solved in O(m + n log n) time [4, 8]. In an
instance of the Minimum Weight Spanning Anti-Arborescence problem, we are
given a directed graph G with arc costs and a budget k ∈ N. The question is whether
there exists a spanning anti-arborescence, i.e., an acyclic subgraph of G such that all
vertices of G but one have out-degree exactly one, of cost at most k.
The basic idea of the algorithm is the following for man-rotations (and symmetri-
cally for woman-rotations). For a set of deleted acceptabilities F , let sFM∗(m) denote the
rotation successor of m after the deletion of F . We need to find a set of deleted accept-
abilities F such that M∗ ∪ {(m, sFM∗(m)) : m ∈ U with sFM∗(m) 6= ∅} is acyclic. Note
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that we can change sM∗(m) only by deleting the pair (m, sM∗(m)). In this case, the new
rotation successor becomes the first woman w′ succeeding sM∗(m) in m’s preference list
that prefers m over M∗(w′). Thus, we know the costs of making a woman w′ the rotation
successor of m. The problem of making M∗ ∪ {(m, sFM∗(m)) : m ∈ U with sFM∗(m) 6= ∅}
acyclic can thus be translated to finding a minimum weight spanning anti-arborescence
by adding a “sink” t to represent the case that sFM∗(m) = ∅.
Theorem 5. Exact-Unique-DeleteAcceptability can be solved in O(n2) time.
Proof. Clearly, any solution needs to delete all blocking pairs. Thus, we assume without
loss of generality that M∗ is a stable matching.
We reduce the problem to two instances of the Minimum Weight Spanning Anti-
Arborescence problem. The first instance of this problem is constructed as follows.
We contract all pairs (m,w) of M∗ to a vertex {m,w} and add a sink t. We add an
arc ({m,w}, {m′, w′}) if w′ prefers m to m′ and m prefers w to w′. The weight of this arc
is the number of women w∗ such that m prefers w∗ to w′ and w to w∗, and w∗ prefers m
to M∗(w∗). We call this graph HU . Similarly, we construct a graph HW (where the roles
of men and women are exchanged).
We claim that M∗ can be made the unique stable matching after the deletion of `
arcs if and only if the minimum weight anti-arborescences in HU and HW together have
weight at most `.
(⇒) Let F ⊆ U ×W be the set of pairs whose deletion makes M∗ the unique stable
matching. Let FU := {(m,w) ∈ F : w m M∗(m)} and FW := {(m,w) ∈ F : m w
M∗(w)}. For any man m, let em := {w′,M∗(w′)}, where w′ is the woman best-ranked
by m succeeding M∗(m) such that w prefers m to M∗(w) after the manipulation, i.e,. w′
is the rotation successor of m after the manipulation. If no such woman exists, then we
set em := t. We construct an anti-arborescence in HU of cost at most |FW | by adding
for each pair (m,w) the arc ({m,w}, em) to the anti-arborescence. We claim that HU is
an anti-arborescence. Every vertex but t has exactly one outgoing arc, so it is enough to
show that there does not exist a cycle. As we have inserted for each man an arc from
the node including him to the node including his rotation successor, there cannot exist
any cycle in the anti-arborescence, as such a cycle would induce a man-rotation in the
modified SM instance. Such a man-rotation cannot exist, as we have assumed that M∗
is the unique stable matching after the modifications.
In the same way one can construct an anti-arborescence of cost |FU | in HW . The
constructed anti-arborescences together have weight at most |FW | + |FU | ≤ |F |, as any
arc in FW ∩ FU would be a blocking pair.
(⇐) Let AU be an anti-arborescence in HU , and AW be an anti-arborescence in HW .
For every arc ({m,w}, {m˜, w˜}) ∈ AU , we delete the acceptability of all pairs {m,w′}
with m preferring w′ to w˜, and w to w′, and w′ preferring m to M∗(w′). After these
deletions, w˜ is the rotation successor of m. Let FU denote the set of pairs deleted. We
proceed with AW analogously, and denote as FW the set of deleted pairs. Clearly, AU
has cost |FU |, and AW has cost |FW |.
Assume that M∗ is not the unique stable matching after deleting the pairs
from FU ∪ FW . Then, without loss of generality, a man-rotation is exposed
in M∗: (mi0 , wj0), . . . , (mir−1 , wjr−1). As we already observed, the anti-aborescence AU
contains all arcs ({m,w}, {m˜, w˜}) where w˜ is m’s rotation-successor (after the deletion
of FU ). Thus, AU contains the arcs ({mik , wjk}, {mik+1 , wjk+1}) for all k ∈ [0, r − 1] (all
indices are taken modulo r). This implies that AU contains a cycle, a contradiction to AU
being an anti-arborescence.
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6 Conclusion
We provided a first comprehensive study of the computational complexity of several ma-
nipulative actions and goals in the context of the Stable Marriage problem. Our rich
and diverse set of theoretical results is surveyed in Table 1.
Several challenges for future research remain. In contrast to the setting considered
here, there is also a destructive view on manipulation, where the goal is to prevent a
certain constellation—our algorithmic results and some of our hardness results for the
constructive case seem to carry over. Moreover, for the Constructive-Unique scenario not
presented here, most of our hardness results still hold. A very specific open question is
whether the Exact-Unique-Swap problem is fixed-parameter tractable when parame-
terized by the budget. Additionally, there is clearly a lot of room for investigating more
manipulative actions or to extend the study of external manipulation to stable match-
ing problems beyond Stable Marriage. Also weighted matchings might be of special
interest.
On the practical side, we performed some preliminary experimental work with some
of the algorithms derived in this paper. We present more details in Appendix F. Exper-
imenting with several forms of synthetic data and one set of real-world data collected in
the context of the analysis of speed dating [7], we draw the following main conclusions
for two of our settings: First, in the Constructive-Exists setting (see also Figures 6 to 8
in Appendix F.1), we observed that for more than half of all possible agent pairs it was
sufficient to delete around 15% or less of the agents to ensure that this agent pair is part
of a stable matching. This suggests that the Delete operation is pretty powerful in this
setting. Second, in the Exact-Exists setting (see also Figures 9 to 11 in Appendix F.2),
the given instance needs to be significantly changed to make a randomly drawn complete
matching stable. Surprisingly, for the powerful action Reorder on average close to half of
the agents had to be modified. In this regard, observe that there always exists a trivial
solution where the preferences of all agents from one gender are reordered.
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A Additional Material for Section 3
A.1 Missing Lemma for Theorem 1
In this reduction, adding the agent mv for some v ∈ V corresponds to manipulating
the corresponding vertex gadget, whereas adding we for some e ∈ E corresponds to
manipulating the corresponding edge gadget. We call the constructed Constructive-
Exists-Add instance Iadd.
Lemma 3. If G contains a clique of size k, then Iadd is a YES-instance.
Proof. Let C be a clique inG. For an edge e = {u, v} ∈ E, we write e ⊆ C to express that e
lies in C, i.e., u ∈ C and v ∈ C. Further, let C[i] denote the vertex with i-th lowest index
in C and D[i] the edge with i-th lowest index in C. We add the ` agents {mv : v ∈ C}
and {m′e : e ⊆ C}, and claim that
M :={(m∗, w∗)} ∪ {(mv, wv) : v ∈ C} ∪ {(m′C[i], w˜i) : i ∈ [k]}∪
{(m′v, wv) : v ∈ V \ C} ∪ {(me, we) : e 6⊆ C}∪
{(m′e, we) : e ⊆ C} ∪ {(mD[i], w†i ) : i ∈ [q]}
is a stable matching, which contains (m∗, w∗). We now iterate over all agents present in
the instance after adding {mv : v ∈ C} and {m′e : e ⊆ C} and arguing why they cannot
be part of a blocking pair.
First, note that for each e 6⊆ C the agents me and we are matched to their first
choice in the instance and, therefore, cannot be part of a blocking pair. So let A :=
Uorig∪Worig∪{mv : v ∈ C}∪{m′e : e ⊆ C} be the agents contained in the instance arising
through the addition of {mv : v ∈ C} ∪ {m′e : e ⊆ C}.
For each vertex v ∈ V \ C, man m′v is matched to his first choice among the agents
in A and thus is not part of a blocking pair. As no neighbor of wv is part of a blocking
pair, also wv is not part of a blocking pair.
For each vertex v ∈ C, the agents mv and wv are matched to their first choice among
the agents in A and thus are not part of a blocking pair. The man m′v, who is matched
to w˜j for some j ∈ [k], cannot form a blocking pair with wv, as this woman cannot be part
of a blocking pair. Moreover, there cannot exist a blocking pair of the form (m′v, w˜i) for
some i ∈ [k], as m′v only prefers women w˜i with i < j. However, all women w˜i with i < j
prefer their current partner to m′v, as they are all assigned a man corresponding to a
vertex with a smaller index than v.
Since all agents from {me : e ⊆ C} have the same preferences over the penalizing
women, and the penalizing women prefer each man from {me : e ⊆ C} to m∗, there is no
blocking pair involving only agents from {me : e ⊆ C} ∪ {m∗} ∪ {w†i : i ∈ [q]}. Thus, M
is stable.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
A.2.1 Swap
From the W[1]-hardness from Theorem 1, we now derive FPT-inapproximability for Con-
structive-Exists-Swap by a reduction from Constructive-Exists-Add. The con-
struction behind our reduction utilizes that Add actions can be modeled as Swap actions
if only certain kind of swaps are allowed. That is why we start by describing how one
can modify a given SM instance such that it is only possible to perform a restricted set of
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swaps using the given budget. To do so, we introduce a set of dummy agents that make
swapping certain agents impossible.
We start by describing how we can add a set of r > ` men md1, . . . , m
d
r and r women w
d
1 ,
. . . , wdr to an SM instance such that in any instance arising through at most ` swaps,
any stable matching contains the edges (mdi , w
d
i ) for all i ∈ [r] regardless where the newly
inserted agents are placed in the preferences of the other agents. This allows us to make
swapping two neighboring agents a and a′ in the preference list of some agent b more
expensive or impossible, as we can insert (some of) the newly added agents in between a
and a′ in b’s preference list.
Given an SM instance I and a set of swap operations S, we denote by I[S] the SM
instance arising through applying the swaps from S to I.
Lemma 4. Let I be a Stable Marriage instance containing r men md1, . . . ,mdr and r
women wd1 , . . . , w
d
r such that the preferences of w
d
i and m
d
i start in the following way,
where all indices are taken modulo r:
mdi : w
d
i  wdi+1  wdi+2  · · ·  wdr+i−1 (rest). . . ,
wdi : m
d
i  mdi+1  mdi+2  · · ·  mdr+i−1 (rest). . . .
For any set S of at most r− 1 swap operations, any stable matching in the instance I[S]
contains the edges (mdi , w
d
i ) for all i ∈ [r].
Proof. Let S be any set of at most r − 1 swap operations. For the sake of contradic-
tion, assume that there exists an i1 ∈ [r] and a stable matching M ∈ MI[S] such that
(mdi1 , w
d
i1
) /∈M . This implies that there either exist s indices i1, . . . is such that (mi1 , wis)
and (mdij+1 , w
d
ij
) ∈ M for j ∈ [s − 1] or there exist some w /∈ {wd1 , . . . , wdr} and m /∈
{md1, . . . ,mdr} together with s indices i1, . . . is such that (mdi1 , w) ∈ M and (m,wdis) ∈ M
and (mdij+1 , w
d
ij
) ∈M for j ∈ [s−1]. It is also possible that the second case where the roles
of men and women are switched holds. However, the argument for this case is symmetric
to the second case.
In the first case, there exists no ij such that both w
d
ij
and mdij+1 prefer their partner
in M to mdij and w
d
ij+1
, respectively, as this would already require r swaps. As at least one
of wdij and m
d
ij+1
needs to prefer his or her partner in M to mdij and w
d
ij+1
, we can assume
without loss of generality that wdij prefers m
d
ij
to mdij+1 . Define dist(p, q) := q−p mod r.
To make wdij prefer m
d
ij+1
to mdij , one needs to perform at least dist(ij , ij+1) swaps in the
preference list of wdij (where is+1 = i1). Summing over all women in the cycle, we get
that at least r swaps are needed, a contradiction.
In the second case, we may assume without loss of generality by the same argument
as in the first case that all women wdij prefer m
d
ij
to mdij+1 , but m
d
ij+1
does not prefer wdij
to wdij+1 for j ∈ [s− 1]. However, this implies that wdis prefers m to mdis , which needs at
least r swaps, a contradiction.
To model Add actions by Swap actions, we consider a variant of Swap, which we call
SwapRestricted: Here, a subsets Aˆ of agents is given, and one is only allowed to swap
the first two agents in the preference lists of agents from Aˆ. Note that by Lemma 4
assuming that the given budget is bounded in advance, it is possible to model SwapRe-
stricted by Swap. SwapRestricted will be used afterwards to get FPT-inapproximability
for Constructive-Exists-Swap.
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Lemma 5. Parameterized by budget `, it is W[1]-hard to decide whether Constructive-
Exists-SwapRestricted has a solution with at most ` swaps or has no solution with
an arbitrary number of allowed swaps.
Proof. We reduce from Constructive-Exists-Add, for which it is W[1]-hard to distin-
guish whether there is a solution with at most ` manipulations or no solution for any
number of additions (see Theorem 1). Let (I, Uadd,Wadd, `) be an instance of Con-
structive-Exists-Add. We form an equivalent instance of Constructive-Exists-
SwapRestricted by adding for each man m ∈ Uadd a woman wm and a man m′,
where wm is added to m’s preferences as the top choice. The man m
′ has wm as his top-
choice and the woman wm has m as her top-choice and m
′ as her second most preferred
man. All other agents follow in an arbitrary order. Similarly, we add for each woman w ∈
Wadd two agents mw and w
′. We set Aˆ := {mw : w ∈Wadd} ∪ {wm : m ∈ Uadd}.
It remains to show that the instances are equivalent. From a solution to Con-
structive-Exists-Add, consisting of the agents XU ∪ XW , one can get a solution
to Constructive-Exists-SwapRestricted by modifying the preferences of wm for
each m ∈ XU and mw for each w ∈ XW by swapping their two most preferred elements.
Vice versa, from a solution to Constructive-Exists-SwapRestricted swapping the
preferences of a set of agents X one can get a solution to Constructive-Exists-Add
by adding w ∈ Wadd if mw has been modified and m ∈ Uadd if wm has been modified. It
is now straightforward to verify the correctness.
Next, we show that the restrictions imposed on the allowed swaps in the SwapRe-
stricted variant can be also modeled in the classical Swap setting. Given a complete
matching M and some subset of agents A′ ⊆ A, we denote as M |A′ the restriction of M
to A′, i.e., M |A′ = {(u,w) ∈M | u,w ∈ A′}:
Lemma 6. Let (I, Aˆ) be a SwapRestricted instance with n men and n women, and 4 ≤
c ∈ N. One can create a Stable Matching instance I ′ by adding 2nc(n − 1) dummy
agents md1, . . . ,m
d
nc(n−1), w
d
1 , . . . , wnc(n−1) such that
(a) for any set S of allowed swap operations in I, it holds thatMI′[S] = {M∪{(mi, wi) :
i ∈ [nc(n− 1)]} : M ∈MI[S]}, and
(b) for any set S′ of at most nc swap operations in the instance I ′, it holds thatMI[S] =
{M |U∪W : M ∈ I[S′]}, where S contains the swaps in S′ between the two most
preferred agents of some agent a ∈ Aˆ in I. Furthermore, any M ∈ I[S′] contains
the edge (mdi , w
d
i ) for i ∈ [2nc(n− 1)].
Proof. Let (I, Aˆ) be an instance of SwapRestricted. We modify the given SM instance I
to obtain a new SM instance I ′ by adding nc(n − 1) additional men md1, . . . ,mdnc(n−1)
and nc(n − 1) additional women wd1 , . . . , wdnc(n−1). For the rest of the proof, all indices
are taken modulo nc+1(n− 1). The preferences of these men and women are as follows:
mdi : w
d
i  wdi+1  wdi+2  · · ·  wdnc(n−1)+i−1
(rest)
. . . ,
wdi : m
d
i  mdi+1  mdi+2  · · ·  mdnc(n−1)+i−1
(rest)
. . . .
For a man m ∈ U \ Aˆ with m : w1  w2  · · ·  wn and a woman w ∈ W \ Aˆ
with w : m1  m2  · · ·  mn, their modified preferences look as follows:
m : w1  wd1  wd2  · · ·  wdnc  w2  wdnc+1  wdnc+2  · · ·  wd2nc  w3  · · ·  wn,
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w : m1  md1  md2  · · ·  mnc  m2  mdnc+1  mdnc+2  · · ·  md2nc  m3  · · ·  mn.
For a man m ∈ U ∩ Aˆ with m : w1  w2  · · ·  wn and analogously for a woman w ∈
W ∩ Aˆ, their modified preferences look as follows:
m : w1  w2  wdnc+1  wdnc+2  · · ·  wd2nc
 w3  w2nc+1  · · ·  w3nc  w4  · · ·  wn.
It remains to prove that both statements from the lemma hold for the given in-
stance (I, Aˆ) and the constructed SM instance I ′. Part (a) is obvious, as mdi and wdi are
their mutual top choices for i ∈ [nc(n− 1)].
To prove part (b), let S′ be any set of at most nc swap operations in I ′. By Lemma 4,
any stable matching in I ′[S′] contains the edges (mdi , wdi ) for i ∈ [r]. As any change which
does not involve at least one agent mdi or w
d
i swaps the two most preferred agents of some
agent a ∈ Aˆ, the lemma follows.
Combining the hardness result from Lemma 5 and the construction from Lemma 6
that models SwapRestricted by Swap, we now prove the following proposition.
Theorem 2 (Second part). Unless FPT = W[1], Constructive-Exists-Swap does
not admit an O(n1−)-approximation in f(`)nO(1) time for any  > 0, even if we are only
allowed to swap the first two men in the preferences of women.
Proof. Fix  > 0 and set c := d1 e.
We reduce from Constructive-Exists-SwapRestricted, for which it is W[1]-hard
to distinguish whether there is a solution with at most ` manipulations or no solution
for any number of additions (see Lemma 5). Let (I, Aˆ, `) be an instance of Construc-
tive-Exists-SwapRestricted. By Lemma 6, we can construct an instance of Con-
structive-Exists-Swap which contains a solution of size at most ` if and only if the
corresponding instance of Constructive-Exists-SwapRestricted contains a solution
of size at most `, and otherwise any solution has size at least nc. Let N = 2nc(n−1)+2n be
the number of agents in the Constructive-Exists-Swap instance. Thus, an O(N1−)-
approximation for Constructive-Exists-Swap allows to decide whether there exists a
solution of size O(N1−) ≤ O(n(c+1)(1−)) ≤ O(n( 1+1)(1−)) ≤ O(n 1−1+1−) ≤ O(n 1−) =
O(nc−) ≤ nc of Constructive-Exists-SwapRestricted (the last inequality holds
only for sufficiently large n), which by Lemma 5 implies FPT = W[1].
A.2.2 DeleteAcceptability and Reorder
The reduction for Add presented in Section 3.1 cannot be directly applied for DeleteAc-
ceptability and Reorder. Instead, new vertex and edge gadgets need to be constructed.
One reason for this is that for Add (and Swap), we could ensure that the penalizing
women are not manipulated. However, they can be manipulated by DeleteAcceptability
and Reorder operations, and, therefore, there exists an easy solution with q manipula-
tions, which just deletes the acceptabilities (m∗, w†i ) in the case of DeleteAcceptability or
moves m∗ to the end of w†i ’s preferences for each i ∈ [q] in the case of Reorder. To avoid
such solutions, we add q additional penalizing men m†1, . . . ,m
†
q, and one manipulation of
an edge gadget will now allow to match both a penalizing woman and a penalizing man
to this edge gadget. We assume without loss of generality that k ≥ 6, as this makes the
proof of Lemmas 8 and 9 easier.
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Figure 3: Visualization of the reduction for DeleteAcceptability . For some edge ep =
{u, v} ∈ E, the edge gadget corresponding to ep and the vertex gadget corresponding
to u (assuming that ep = e
u
j ) are included as well as m
∗ and w∗ together with penalizing
agents m†i and w
†
i for some arbitrary i ∈ [q].
We now describe the details of the construction of the SM instance that we want to
manipulate, which is the same for manipulative actions Reorder and DeleteAcceptability .
For each vertex v ∈ V , we introduce a gadget consisting of one vertex woman wv and one
vertex man mv together with one woman w
′
v and one man m
′
v. The preferences are as
follows:
wv : m
′
v  mev1  · · ·  mevdv  mv 
(rest)
. . . , w′v : m
′
v  mv  (rest). . . ,
mv : w
′
v  wev1  · · ·  wevdv  wv 
(rest)
. . . , m′v : w
′
v  wv  (rest). . . .
For each edge, we introduce a gadget consisting of one edge man me, one edge woman we
together with two men m′e and m′′e , and two women w′e and w′′e . The preferences are as
follows:
me : w
′
e  wu  wv  w†1  · · ·  w†q 
(rest)
. . . , m′e : w
′′
e  we (rest). . . ,
we : m
′
e  mu  mv  m†1  · · ·  m†q 
(rest)
. . . , w′e : m
′′
e  me (rest). . . ,
m′′e : w
′′
e  w′e (rest). . . , w′′e : m′′e  m′e (rest). . . .
See Figure 3 for an example of a vertex gadget and an edge gadget. The preferences of
the agents m∗, w∗ and the penalizing agents are as follows:
w†i : me1  · · ·  mem  m∗
(rest)
. . . , m∗ : w†1  · · ·  w†q  w∗
(rest)
. . . ,
m†i : we1  · · ·  wem  w∗
(rest)
. . . , w∗ : m†1  · · ·  m†q  m∗
(rest)
. . . .
Finally, we set ` :=
(
k
2
)
+ k. We denote as Idel the resulting instance of Construc-
tive-Exists-DeleteAcceptability and as Ireor the resulting instance of Construc-
tive-Exists-Reorder Ireor. In the following, in Lemma 7, we prove the first part of the
correctness of the reduction for both Reorder and DeleteAcceptability . In Lemma 8, we
prove the second part of the correctness for Reorder and in Lemma 9 for DeleteAccept-
ability .
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Lemma 7. If G contains a clique of size k, then Idel and Ireor are YES-instances.
Proof. Let C be a clique. We denote by D[i] the edge with i-th lowest index in the clique.
In Idel, we delete the following ` edges. For each v ∈ C, we delete (m′v, w′v), and for
each edge e ⊆ C, we delete (m′′e , w′′e ). In Ireor, we manipulate the following ` agents. For
each v ∈ C, we change the preferences of m′v to m′v : wv  (rest). . . . For each edge e ⊆ C,
we manipulate the preferences of m′′e to m′′e : w′e (rest). . . .
We claim that the matching
M :={(m∗, w∗)} ∪ {(mv, w′v), (m′v, wv) : v ∈ C} ∪ {(m′v, w′v), (mv, wv) : v ∈ V \ C}∪
{(me, w′e), (m′e, we), (m′′e , w′′e ) : e 6⊆ C} ∪ {(m′e, w′′e ), (m′′e , w′e) : e ⊆ C}∪
{(mD[i], w†i ), (m†i , wD[i]) : i ∈ [q]},
which contains (m∗, w∗), is stable.
To see this, first note that for each e 6⊆ C, the agents me, m′′e , we, and w′′e are matched
to their first choices, and therefore are not part of a blocking pair. As a consequence,
also m′e and w′e cannot be part of a blocking pair.
For each agent v ∈ V \C, both m′v and w′v are matched to their first choices and thus
not part of a blocking pair. As no neighbor of mv or wv is part of a blocking pair, also mv
and wv are not part of a blocking pair.
For each agent v ∈ C, the agents mv, m′v, wv, and w′v are matched to their first choices
and thus not part of a blocking pair.
Since all agents from {me : e ⊆ C} have the same preferences over the penalizing
women, and the penalizing women prefer each man from {me : e ⊆ C} to m∗, there is no
blocking pair involving only agents from {me : e ⊆}∪{m∗}∪{w†i : i ∈ [q]}. Symmetrically,
it follows that no blocking pair involves only agents from {we : e ⊆ C} ∪ {w∗} ∪ {m†i : i ∈
[q]}, and thus, M is stable.
Lemma 8. If Ireor is a YES-instance, then G contains a clique of size k.
Proof. Let Xreor be the set of at most ` agents whose preferences have been reordered,
and let M be a stable matching containing (m∗, w∗). In the following, we call a vertex
agent av unhappy if she is not matched to one of her dv+1 most preferred partners, i.e., a
vertex agent is unhappy if she prefers all edge agents of edges incident to v to her current
partner. Note that for each edge gadget for an edge e such that no agent from the edge
gadget is contained in Xreor, any stable matching contains the edges (me, w
′
e), (m
′
e, we),
and (m′′e , w′′e ). In the case that an edge agent ae is the only agent from this edge gadget
contained in Xreor, matching M contains the edge (me, w
′
e) if ae = we and (we,m
′
e)
if ae = me. Furthermore, each penalizing agent a
†
i is contained in Xreor or matched to an
edge agent ae.
Let p be the number of penalizing or edge agents in Xreor. As there are 2
(
k
2
)
penalizing
agents, at least 2
(
k
2
)−p of them need to be matched to edge agents which are not in Xreor,
as each penalizing agent only prefers edge agents to m∗ or w∗. As matching an edge agent
to a penalizing agent requires that at least one agent from her edge gadget is part of Xreor,
it follows that at least
2(k2)−p
2 + p =
(
k
2
)
+ p2 ≤ ` preference reorderings happen in edge
gadgets or penalizing agents. As ` =
(
k
2
)
+ k, it follows that p ≤ 2k.
For every vertex agent au it holds that if none of the vertices from her vertex com-
ponent is contained in Xreor, then the agent au is either matched to an edge agent or
unhappy. As all but at most k − p2 preference reorderings happen in edge gadgets and
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penalizing agents, and at least 2
(
k
2
) − p edge agents are matched to penalizing agents,
there can be at most 2k − p happy vertex agents. Thus, without loss of generality there
exist at most k− p2 happy vertex men mu (otherwise we apply the following argument for
happy vertex women).
At least
(
k
2
)− p penalizing men are matched to edge women which are not contained
in Xreor. These
(
k
2
)−p edge women we for some e ∈ E prefer the vertex men corresponding
to the endpoints of e. Since at most k − p2 vertex men do not prefer to be matched to
these edge women, it follows that the
(
k
2
)− p edges have at most k− p2 endpoints. This is
only possible if
(
k
2
)−p ≤ (k− p2
2
)
which is equivalent to 4kp ≤ p2+10p, implying (as p ≥ 0)
that p = 0 or p ≥ 4k − 10. However, the latter case combined with p ≤ 2k implies that
2k ≥ p ≥ 4k − 10, a contradiction for k ≥ 6. It follows that p = 0. This implies that
indeed k vertex men are happy and that the k vertices corresponding to these vertex men
form a clique.
In a similar way, we can show the analogous statement for Idel.
Lemma 9. If Idel is a YES-instance, then G contains a clique of size k.
Proof. Let Xdel be the set of at most ` pairs which have been deleted, and let M be a
stable matching containing (m∗, w∗). Note that for each edge gadget for an edge e such
that no pair from the edge gadget is contained in Xdel, any stable matching contains
the edges (me, w
′
e), (m
′
e, we), and (m
′′
e , w
′′
e ). For each penalizing agent a
†
i , either the
edge (a†i , a
∗) where a∗ is the agent from {m∗, w∗} of opposite gender is contained in Xdel
or a†i is matched to an edge agent ae. Let p be the number of pairs in Xdel containing
a penalizing agent and an agent from {m∗, w∗}. As there are 2(k2) penalizing agents, at
least
2(k2)−p
2 + p =
(
k
2
)
+ p2 ≤ ` deletions happen with both endpoints in edge gadgets or
between penalizing agents and an agent from {m∗, w∗}. From this, it follows that p ≤ 2k.
For every vertex agent au it holds that if no pair in the corresponding vertex gadget
is contained in Xdel and no pair including au is contained in Xdel, then the agent au is
either matched to an edge agent or unhappy. As all but k − p2 manipulations happen
without any vertex agent, and at least 2
(
k
2
) − p edge agents are matched to penalizing
agents, there can be at most 2k− p happy vertex agents. The rest of the argument is the
same as in the proof of 8.
The following theorem follows directly from Lemmas 7 to 9.
Theorem 2 (First part). Parameterized by budget `, Constructive-Exists-
DeleteAcceptability is W[1]-hard. Parameterized by `, Constructive-Exists-
Reorder is W[1]-hard, even if we are only allowed to reorder the preferences of agents
of one gender.
Note that the presented construction, in contrast to the reduction for Add and Swap,
does not have implications for the inapproximability of Reorder and DeleteAcceptability .
In particular, as described in the beginning of this section, there always exists a trivial
solution of cost 2q. In fact, we show in the next section that Reorder admits a factor-2
approximation. Note further that the presented construction is also a valid parameterized
reduction from Clique to Constructive-Exists-Swap; however, we derived a stronger
hardness result for this problem (yielding also FPT-inapproximability).
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A.3 Missing Details for Theorem 3 and Proof of Proposition 1
The polynomial-time result for Delete might be particularly surprising because of the
strong hardness result that we derived for the related manipulative action Add. However,
the reason for this is that for Delete one has less flexibility in choosing the manipulative
action to perform, i.e., because of some conflicts it might be easy to see that some agents
need to be deleted and that there is no cheaper solution (Lemma 2), whereas for Add
there are presumably multiple ways how one could resolve such a conflict. Similarly, we
derived an inapproximability result for Swap, while the seemingly similar manipulative
action Reorder admits a 2-factor approximation in the Constructive-Exists setting. The
reason for this is that the Reorder operation is more powerful, allowing to create in some
sense trivial solutions. These trivial solutions are relatively cheap because if one knows
that it is necessary to modify the preferences of some agent, then one can modify them
arbitrarily and also in a way that guarantees to lead to a solution without using more
than twice of the optimal budget needed. Thus, compared to the Swap setting where one
can save quite some manipulative actions by choosing the swaps to perform, it does not
make a fundamental difference how the agent’s preferences are reordered. We start by
presenting the missing proof of Lemma 2, and then describe the factor-2 approximation
algorithm for Reorder.
A.3.1 Delete
Lemma 2. Let I ′ be an SMI instance and a ∈ A some agent. Then, there exists at most
one agent a′ ∈ A who was unassigned in I ′, i.e., a′ /∈ ma(I ′), and is matched in I ′ \{a},
i.e., a′ ∈ ma(I ′ \ {a}).
Proof. Let M be some stable matching in I ′ and M ′ be some stable matching in I ′ \ {a}.
We prove |ma(M ′) \ ma(M)| ≤ 1, which is clearly equivalent to the statement of the
lemma. To do so, we examine the symmetric difference S of the two matchings M
and M ′. The set S is a set of maximal paths and cycles of even length. We do not care
about cycles, as all agents in such a cycle are matched in both M and M ′. Therefore, we
turn to paths.
First of all, we claim that all paths include a. Assume that there exists a path p =
(a1, . . . , ak+1) for some k ∈ N not including a, starting without loss of generality with a
pair matched in M . Then, as (a1, a2) is not a blocking pair in M
′, it holds that a3 a2 a1.
As (a2, a3) is not a blocking pair in M , it holds that a4 a3 a2. Consequently, it holds
that ak+1 ak ak−1. If k is even, then ak+1 is unassigned in M , and thus (ak, ak+1) is
a blocking pair in M , contradicting the stability of M . Otherwise, ak+1 is unassigned
in M ′, and (ak, ak+1) is blocking in M ′.
From this it follows that there exists at most one maximal path p. As agent a cannot
be part of M ′, it needs to be one of the endpoints of p. Consequently, the only agent that
could be matched in M ′ but not matched in M is the other endpoint of p.
A.3.2 Factor-2 Approximation for Reorder
It is also possible to follow a similar approach as for Constructive-Exists-Delete
to construct a factor-2 approximation for the optimization version of Constructive-
Exists-Reorder. We construct an instance I ′ identically as in the case of Construc-
tive-Exists-Delete: Let W ∗ be the set of women preferred by m∗ to w∗, and U∗ the set
of men preferred by w∗ to m∗. In all stable matchings M including (m∗, w∗), every woman
that m∗ prefers to w∗ needs to be matched to a man which she prefers to m∗, or needs
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to be deleted. Analogously, every man that w∗ prefers to m∗ needs to be matched to a
woman which he prefers to w∗. Consequently, all pairs consisting of an agent a ∈ U∗∪W ∗
and an agent a′ which a does not prefer over w∗ or m∗ cannot be part of any stable match-
ing. This observation motivates a transformation of the given SM instance I into a SMI
instance I ′ through the deletion of all such pairs. We also delete w∗ and m∗ from I ′ and
compute a stable matching M in the resulting instance.
We observe analogously to Lemma 2 that by reordering the preferences of an agent,
at most two previously unassigned agents become matched in an SMI instance:
Lemma 10. Let I ′ be an SMI instance, a∗ ∈ A some agent and let I˜ denote the
instance I ′ after reordering and extending a∗’s preferences arbitrarily. There exists at
most one man m ∈ U and at most one woman w ∈ W who are unassigned in I ′,
i.e., m,w /∈ ma(I ′), and are matched in I˜, i.e., m,w ∈ ma(I˜).
Proof. The proof proceeds analogously to the proof of Lemma 2. Let again M be some
stable matching in I ′ and M ′ a stable matching in I˜. In contrast to Lemma 2, here
it is enough to prove that |ma(M ′) \ ma(M)| ≤ 2. We examine again the symmetric
difference and conclude that only the unique maximal path including a∗ can change the
set of matched agents. As this path has only two endpoints, at most two agents which are
not matched in M can become matched in M ′. On the one hand, assuming that the path
has even length, only one of the endpoints can lie in M ′. On the other hand, assuming
that the path has odd length, one of the endpoints needs to correspond to a woman and
one to a man.
Then, again similarly to Theorem 3, it is possible to construct a straightforward
solution, which matches one agent from A∗ which is currently not matched in any stable
matching in I ′ by reordering the preferences of one agent. Using Lemma 10, we now show
that this approach yields a factor-2 approximation of the optimal solution:
Proposition 1. One can compute a factor-2 approximation of the optimization version
of Constructive-Exists-Reorder in O(n2) time.
Proof. Given an instance of Constructive-Exists-Reorder consisting of an SM in-
stance I = (U,W,P), budget `, and the pair (m∗, w∗), we construct an SMI instance I ′
and set A∗ as described above. The 2-approximation algorithm proceeds as follows:
• Compute a stable matching M in I ′.
• Fix any matching N on A′ := A \ ma(M), and change the preferences of each
agent a ∈ A′ such that N(a) is a’s first choice.
The correctness of the solution returned by the algorithm and the approximation factor
can be proven in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 3.
First, we show that M ′ := M ∪N ∪{(m∗, w∗)} is a stable matching after the described
reorderings of the preferences. Clearly, no agent from A′ is part of a blocking pair, as
they are matched to their first choice. By the same arguments as in Theorem 3, none of
the other agents is part of a blocking pair.
It remains to show that at least q := |A
′|
2 reorderings are needed. Assume that less
than q reorderings are needed, and let B = {b1, . . . , bk} with k < q be the set of agents
whose preferences have been reordered; we call the SM instance arising through these
reorderings by I∗. Let M be a stable matching containing (m∗, w∗) in the instance I∗.
Let Mi be a stable matching in the instance I ′i arising from I ′ by replacing the preference
list of b1, . . . , bi by their modified, complete preferences, and also adding b1, . . . , bi to
24
the preferences of every agent a (except m∗ and w∗) of opposite gender according to a’s
preferences in I. Then, each agent of B is matched in Mk, as their preferences are
complete and there are the same number of men and women. By the definition of A′, all
agents from A′ are unassigned in M0. Note that each agent a ∈ A′ ⊆ U∗ ∪W ∗ is either
part of B or prefers M(a) over m∗ or w∗ due to the stability of M ; in particular, a is
matched in M . Since k < |A
′|
2 it follows by Lemma 10 that at least one agent a
′ of A′ is
not modified, and unmatched in Mk, without loss of generality a
′ is a man m′.
Since m′ is contained in A′, we know that w∗ prefers m′ over m∗. Let P =
(m′, w1,m1, w2,m2, . . . , wp,mp) be the alternating path containing m′ in the symmet-
ric difference of M and Mk. Due to the stability of M , man m
′ prefers w1 := M(m′)
over w∗. Due to the stability of Mk, woman w1 prefers m1 := Mk(w1) over m′. By induc-
tion, it follows that mi prefers wi+1 over wi for all i ∈ [p−1], and wi prefers mi over mi−1
for all i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , i}. This alternating path ends with an edge (mp, wp) ∈ M , as M
is a perfect matching. Due to the stability of Mk, and since wp prefers mp over mp−1,
the edge e = (mp, wp) is not present in I ′k. It follows that neither mp nor wp are con-
tained in B (as else their preferences in I ′k would have been complete). If e was deleted
because w∗ prefers mp over m∗ and mp prefers w∗ over wp, then (mp, w∗) is a blocking
pair for M . Otherwise, the edge e was deleted because m∗ prefers wp over w∗, and wp
prefers m∗ over mp. This implies that (m∗, wp) is a blocking pair for M . In both cases,
we get a blocking pair for M , a contradiction to the stability of M . It follows that the
assumption |B| < |A′|2 is wrong, and thus, the algorithm computes a 2-approximation.
B Additional Material for Section 4
As argued in Section 4, in the Exact-Exists setting, we need to “resolve” all pairs that are
blocking for the given matching M∗ by manipulating the preferences of at least one agent a
in each blocking pair such that she no longer prefers the other agent in the blocking pair
to M∗(a). For a matching M and an SM instance I, we denote by bp(M, I) the set of all
blocking pairs of M in I. For a blocking pair β = (m,w) ∈ bp(M, I) and an agent a ∈ β,
we denote as β(a) the other agent in the blocking pair.
The optimal solution for an instance of Exact-Exists-DeleteAcceptability is to
delete the acceptability of all blocking pairs. The set of blocking pairs can be computed
inO(n2) time. This solution is optimal, as it is always necessary to delete the acceptability
of all blocking pairs and, by doing so, no new pairs will become blocking and non-blocking.
Observation 1. Exact-Exists-DeleteAcceptability is solvable in O(n2) time.
Turning to Reorder, to find an optimal solution, it is necessary to find a minimal
subset A′ ⊆ U ∪W such that A′ covers bp(M∗, I), i.e., all pairs that block M∗ in the
given SM instance I, implying the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Exact-Exists-Reorder reduces to finding a vertex cover in a bipartite
graph and is, hence, solvable in O(n2.5) time.
Proof. Given an instance of Exact-Exists-Reorder consisting of an SM instance I
together with a matching M∗, we construct a bipartite graph as follows. For each a ∈ A,
we introduce a vertex and we connect two vertices a, a′ ∈ A if (a, a′) ∈ bp(M∗, I). Note
that the resulting graph is bipartite, as there cannot exist a blocking pair consisting of
two men or two women. We compute a minimum vertex cover V ′ in the graph, i.e., a
subset of vertices such that all edges are incident to at least one vertex in V ′, using the
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Hopcroft–Karp algorithm in O(n2.5) time [12]. For each a ∈ V ′, we reorder a’s preferences
such that M∗(a) becomes a’s top-choice. After these reorderings, M∗ is stable, as for each
blocking pair β, for at least one involved agent a ∈ β, the agent M∗(a) is now a’s top-
choice, and no new blocking pairs are created by this procedure. Moreover, the computed
solution is optimal. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists a smaller
solution. Then, there exists an (m,w) ∈ bp(M∗, I) where neither m’s nor w’s preferences
have been modified. However, this implies that (m,w) still blocks M∗.
Now, we turn to the manipulative action Swap. Here, the cost of resolving a block-
ing pair (m,w) by manipulating m’s preferences is the number of swaps needed to
swap M∗(m) with w, and the cost of resolving the pair by manipulating w’s prefer-
ences is the number of swaps needed to swap M∗(w) with w. This observation could
make one believe that it is optimal to determine for each blocking pair the agent with
the lower cost and let her resolve the pair by performing the corresponding swaps. How-
ever, this approach is not optimal, as by resolving some blocking pair involving an agent
also another blocking pair involving this agent might be resolved, as we observe it in the
following example:
Example 1. Consider an instance of Exact-Exists-Swap consisting of the following
SM instance together with budget ` = 3 and M∗ = {(m1, w3), (m2, w2), (m3, w1)}:
• m1 : w1  w2  w3,
• m2 : w2  w3  w1,
• m3 : w2  w3  w1,
• w1 : m1  m2  m3,
• w2 : m1  m3  m2, and
• w3 : m1  m2  m3.
The set of blocking pairs of M∗ is: bp(M∗, I) = {(m1, w1), (m1, w2), (m3, w2)}. In this
example, the cost to resolve the pair (m1, w1) by modifying m1’s preference list is two, i.e.,
swap w3 and w2 and subsequently w3 and w1. However, by doing this, the other blocking
pair (m1, w2) including m1 is also resolved. In fact, these swaps are part of the unique
optimal solution to make M∗ stable, which is to swap w3 and w2 and subsequently w3
and w1 in m1’s preference relation and to swap m3 and m2 in w2’s preference relation.
In the following, we describe how Exact-Exists-Swap can be solved in cubic time
in the number of agents by reducing it to an instance of Minimum Cut. In the Mini-
mum Cut problem, we are given an edge-weighted directed graph G together with two
vertices s and t and an integer k, and the question is to decide whether there exists
a subset of arcs of summed weight at most k such that every (s, t)-path in G includes
at least one of these arcs. Before describing the reduction, let us introduce some no-
tation. For two agents a, a′ ∈ A, let c(a, a′) denote the number of swaps needed such
that a prefers M∗(a) to a′, i.e., c(a, a′) = max
(
rank(a,M∗(a)) − rank(a, a′), 0), where
rank(a, a′) is one plus the number of agents a prefers to a′. Moreover, for each a ∈ A,
let qa denote the number of blocking pairs involving a and let β
a
1 , . . . , β
a
qa be a list of
these blocking pairs ordered decreasingly by the number of swaps in a’s preferences
that are needed until a prefers M∗(a) to β(a) and thereby to resolve the blocking pair,
i.e., c(a, βa1 (a)) ≥ c(a, βa2 (a)) ≥ · · · ≥ c(a, βaqa(a)). For a blocking pair β ∈ U × W
with a ∈ β, we denote as id(a, β) the position of blocking pair β in a’s list of blocking
pairs, that is, id(a, β) = i if β = βai . Using this notation, we now prove the following:
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um12
um31
uw11
uw21
uw22
t
2
2
1
∞
∞
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1
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Figure 4: Min-Cut graph constructed to solve Example 1. Note that βm11 =
(m1, w1), β
m1
2 = (m1, w2) with c(m1, β
m1
1 (m1)) = 2 and c(m1, β
m1
2 (m1)) = 1; β
m3
1 =
(m3, w2) with c(m3, β
m3
1 (m3)) = 2; β
w1
1 = (m1, w1) with c(w1, β
w1
1 (w1)) = 2; β
w2
1 =
(m1, w2), β
m2
2 = (m3, w2) with c(w2, β
w2
1 (w2)) = 2 and c(w2, β
w2
2 (w2)) = 1. The unique
solution is E′ := {(s, um11 ), (uw22 , uw21 )}.
Theorem 6. Exact-Exists-Swap is solvable in O(n3) time.
Proof. Let S be a set of swap operations of minimum cardinality such that after perform-
ing the swap operations S, the given matching M∗ is stable. Let a ∈ A be some agent
and i ∈ N the number of swap operations from S modifying the preferences of a. Then, it
is possible to replace these i swap operations by swapping M∗(a) by i positions to the top
in a’s preference list. The resulting set of swap operations S′ consists of the same number
of swaps and makes M∗ still stable, as there is no agent which a prefers to M∗(a) after
the swap operations in S′ but not after the swap operations in S. As a consequence, it is
enough to consider the solutions to the given Exact-Exists-Swap instance that corre-
sponds to a tuple (da1 , . . . , da2n), where da encodes the number of times M
∗(a) is swapped
with its left neighbor in a’s preference relation. Note that (da1 , . . . , da2n) is a valid solution
to the problem if for each blocking pair (m,w) ∈ bp(M∗, I) it holds that dm ≥ c(m,w) or
that dw ≥ c(w,m). Now, we are ready to reduce the given Exact-Exists-Swap instance
to an instance of the Minimum Cut problem.
Reduction to Minimum Cut. We start by constructing a weighted directed
graph G: For each man m, we introduce one vertex for each blocking pair m is part
of: um1 , . . . , u
m
qm . Similarly, for each woman w ∈ W , we introduce one vertex for each
blocking pair w is part of: uw1 , . . . , u
w
qw . Moreover, we add a source s and a sink t.
Turning to the arc set, for each m ∈ U that is included in at least one blocking
pair, we introduce an arc from s to um1 of cost c(m,β
m
1 (m)). Moreover, for each i ∈
[qm−1], we introduce an arc from umi to umi+1 of cost c(m,βmi+1(m)). For each woman w ∈
W that is included in at least one blocking pair, we introduce an arc from uw1 to t of
cost c(w, βw1 (w)). Moreover, for each i ∈ [qw − 1], we introduce an arc from uwi+1 to uwi of
cost c(w, βwi+1(w)). For each blocking pair β = (m,w) ∈ bp(M∗, I), we introduce an arc
from umid(m,β) to u
w
id(w,β) of infinite cost. We visualize the described reduction in Figure 4
where the graph corresponding to Example 1 is displayed.
The general idea of the construction is that cutting an arc incident to some vertex
of an agent a of cost c is equivalent to swapping up M∗(a) in a’s preference list c times.
Thereby, all blocking pairs with costs at most c for a are resolved (all paths visiting the
corresponding vertices are cut) and we encode for each agent the entry in the solution
tuple by the cutted arc incident to one of her vertices. For each blocking pair either the
involved woman or the involved man needs to resolve the pair, as otherwise there still
exists an (s, t)-path.
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Formally, we compute a minimum cut E′ ⊆ E of the constructed graph, which can
be done in O(n3) time [21, 14]. Note that for each agent a only at most one arc to one
of ua1, . . . , u
a
qa is contained in E
′. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there
exist two vertices uai and u
a
j with i < j such that both the arc to u
a
i and u
a
j have been
cut. Then, already cutting the arc to uai destroys all (s, t)-paths visiting u
j
a.
Using E′, we construct a solution tuple as follows. For each a, we set da = 0 if no arc
to a vertex from ua1, . . . , u
a
qa has been cut. Otherwise, let u
a
i be the destination of the arc
in the cut. We set da = c(a, β
a
i (a)). Note that the cost of the cut corresponds to the cost
of the constructed solution.
Correctness. It remains to prove that the solution (da1 , . . . , da2n) computed by our
algorithm is indeed a solution to the given Constructive-Exists-Swap instance and
that no solution of smaller cost exists. To prove the first part, for the sake of contradiction,
let us assume that there exists a pair β = (m,w) ∈ bp(M∗, I) that is still blocking, i.e., it
holds that dm < c(m,w) and dw < c(w,m). However, this implies that there exists a path
from s to umid(m,β) and from u
w
id(w,β) to t, as no arcs on the unique path from s to u
m
id(m,β)
were cut by E′, as they were all of cost greater than c(m,w). A similar argument holds
for uwid(w,β) and t. Moreover, there exists an arc of infinite cost from u
m
id(m,β) to u
w
id(w,β)
which implies the existence of an (s, t)-path. This leads to a contradiction.
To prove the second part, let us assume that there exists a solution (d′a1 , . . . , d
′
a2n)
of smaller cost. However, it is possible to construct from this a cut of the constructed
graph of smaller cost than the cut induced by the computed arcs E′ which leads to a
contradiction. For each agent a ∈ A, we include in the cut E′ the arc to one of the
vertices from ua1, . . . , u
a
qa of maximal cost still at most d
′
a. We claim that after deleting
all arcs E′ from the graph, there is no (s, t)-path. For the sake of contradiction, let us
assume that there exists an (s, t)-path. Then there exist m ∈ U and w ∈W with i ∈ [qm]
and j ∈ [qw] such that this path includes the arc from umi to uwj . However, as it needs
to hold that d′m ≥ c(m,βmi (m)) or d′w ≥ c(w, βwj (w)), either an arc from the unique path
from s to umi or an arc from the unique path from u
w
j to t is part of E
′. This leads to a
contradiction.
Recalling that we have seen in Section 3.1 that the Exact-Exists problem is NP-hard
for Swap, DeleteAcceptability , and Reorder if only one edge instead of a full matching is
given, the case where the full matching is specified can be interpreted as the easy case.
Looking now at cases in between these two, i.e., an arbitrary number j of edges that
should be included in some stable matching is given, it is possible to come up with an
FPT-algorithm with respect to the parameter n− j.
Proposition 4. To decide whether it is possible for a given SM instance I and partial
matching M˜ ⊆ U ×W of size j to modify I using Swap/ DeleteAcceptability/ Reorder
actions such that M˜ is part of some stable matching is solvable in (n− j)!nO(1) time.
Proof. It is possible to brute force over all possibilities M˜ ′ of matching the remaining 2(n−
j) agents to each other. There are (n− j)! such possibilities (fix an ordering of men and
iterate over all possible orderings of women and match two agents at the same position
in the orderings to each other). For each possibility, we employ the respective algorithm
from above to decide whether the complete matching M˜ ∪ M˜ ′ can be made stable using
at most ` manipulative actions.
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C Additional Material for Section 4
C.1 Missing Details for Theorem 4
Theorem 4. Exact-Unique-Reorder parameterized by ` is W[2]-hard, even if the
given matching M∗ is already stable in the original instance and we are only allowed to
modify the preferences of agents of one gender.
Proof. It remains to prove the correctness of the construction presented in the main body
of the paper. We now show that the given Hitting Set instance admits a solution of
size k if an only if it is possible to make M∗ the unique stable matching in the constructed
SM instance by reordering the preferences of at most ` agents.
(⇒) Let X = {z1, . . . , zk} be a hitting set. We order F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fp} arbitrarily
and modify the preferences of wzi to be the following: wzi : m
1
F1
 m1F2  · · ·  m1Fp 
mzi  (rest). . . . Matching M∗ is still a stable matching, as each man is matched to his first
choice. To show that M∗ is the unique stable matching, we utilize that if a second stable
matching M ′ exists, then the union of M∗ ∪M ′ needs to contain at least one cycle which
consists of alternating edges from the two matchings. Moreover, as M∗ is man-optimal,
each woman contained in the cycle needs to prefer the man matched to her in M ′ to the
man matched to her in M∗. We now argue that such a cycle cannot exist and thereby
that M∗ is the unique stable matching. First of all, note that this cycle cannot contain
an agent mz for some z ∈ Z, as no woman prefers such a man to her partner in M∗.
Furthermore, it cannot contain an agent m1F for some F ∈ F . The reason for this is that,
as X contains at least one z ∈ F , the preferences of at least one woman wz with z ∈ F
have been reordered such that wz now prefers m
1
F to mz. A cycle containing m
1
F cannot
exist, as this would imply that m1F is matched to some woman from a set-gadget that is
not his top-choice in M ′ and thereby that M ′ is blocked by the pair (m1F , wz). Hence,
it cannot contain an agent m2F , as—since m
1
F and therefore also M
∗(m1F ) = w
1
F are not
contained in the cycle—the pair (m2F , w
1
F ) would block M
′ in this case.
(⇐) Let S be the set of agents whose preferences have been modified. From this, we
construct a solution X to the given Hitting Set problem as follows. For each agent mz
or wz contained in S, we add the element z to X, and for each agent m
i
F or w
i
F contained
in S, we add an arbitrary element z ∈ F to X. Clearly, |X| ≤ |S| ≤ k, so it remains to
show that X is a hitting set.
Assume that F ∈ F does not intersect X. Then the preferences of miF , wiF , and
all wz for all z ∈ F are unchanged. We claim that M ′ :=
(
M∗ \ {(m1F , w1F ), (m2F , w2F )}
) ∪
{(m1F , w2F ), (m2F , w1F )} is a stable matching, contradicting the fact that M∗ is the unique
stable matching.
As M∗ is stable and M∗ and M ′ only differ in m1F , w
2
F , m
2
F , and w
1
F , any blocking
pair for M ′ must contain an agent miF or w
i
F for some i ∈ {1, 2}. Agent wiF is matched to
her first choice and thus is not part of a blocking pair. The only agent which is preferred
to w1F by m
2
F is w
2
F . However, w
2
F is matched to her top-choice in M
′. Similarly, all
agents which are preferred to w2F by m
1
F are matched to their first choices, and thus do
not participate in a blocking pair. Thus, no blocking pair for M ′ can exist.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Exact-Unique-Swap is NP-complete, even if the given matching M∗
is already stable in the original instance and we are only allowed to modify the preferences
of agents of one gender.
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Proof. Membership in NP is obvious, as it is possible to determine in polynomial time
whether a stable matching is unique.
We adopt the reduction from Hitting Set to Exact-Unique-Reorder as follows.
Let (Z,F , k) be an instance of Hitting Set, and let (I,M∗, `) be the instance of Ex-
act-Unique-Reorder arising from the reduction described in the proof of Theorem 4.
We assume that ` ≤ n, as else I is a trivial YES-instance. In the following we mod-
ify (I,M∗, `) as follows. We add n5 men md1, . . . , mdn5 and n5 women wd1 , . . . , wdn5 , where
the preferences of mdi and w
d
i are as follows (indices are taken modulo n
5):
mdi : w
d
i  wdi+1  wdi+2  · · ·  wdn5+i−1
(rest)
. . . ,
wdi : m
d
i  mdi+1  mdi+2  · · ·  mdn5+i−1
(rest)
. . . .
For each z ∈ Z, we add in wz’s preference list n2 dummy men after mz, and the remaining
dummy men at the end of wz’s preference list. For all other women w ∈W \{wz | z ∈ Z},
we insert n4 dummy men between each two neighboring agents in w’s preferences. For
each men m ∈ U , we insert n4 dummy women between two neighboring agents in m’s
preferences. We set M ′ := M∗ ∪ {(mdi , wdi ) : i ∈ [n5]} and the overall budget to `′ :=
k(n2 + n). The reduction clearly runs in polynomial time, so it remains to show its
correctness.
(⇒) Let X = {z1, . . . , zk} be a hitting set. For each zi ∈ X, we change the preferences
of wzi by swapping mzi down n
2 + n times such that after the modification she prefers,
for all F ∈ F , the agent m1F to mzi . Thus, the overall number of performed swaps is
at most `′. By Lemma 4, any stable matching in the modified instance contains the
edges (mdi , w
d
i ) for each i ∈ [n5]. It follows by the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 4 that M ′ is the unique stable matching.
(⇐) Since `′ < n4, we can swap pairs containing two non-dummy agents only for
agents wz for some z ∈ Z. Note that swapping the agent mz with any non-dummy
agent in the preferences of wz requires at least n
2 swaps, and thus, this happens for at
most k such agents. The corresponding elements of Z now form a hitting set by the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.
D XP-Algorithms for Reorder
In this section, we present two XP-algorithms for the manipulative action Reorder. We
start by considering the Constructive-Exists setting.
Proposition 5. Constructive-Exists-Reorder can be solved in O(2`n2`+2) time.
Proof. We guess the set X of ` agents whose preferences are modified, and for each
agent a ∈ X, we guess an agent T (a) to which a is matched in a stable matching. For
each a ∈ X, we modify the preferences of a such that T (a) is its top choice. We check
whether the resulting instance contains a stable matching containing the edge (m∗, w∗).
If any guess results in a stable matching containing (m∗, w∗), then we return YES, and
NO otherwise.
The running time of the algorithm is O(2`n2`+2), as we guess a set of ` out of 2n agents
whose preference are modified, and for each of these ` agents we guess to which agent it is
matched to. Checking whether there exists a stable matching containing (m∗, w∗) can be
done in time O(n2) for each guess. It remains to show the correctness. If the algorithm
returns YES, then the instance clearly is a YES-instance. Assume that there exists a
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set Y of at most ` agents such that in an instance IY arising through the reordering the
preferences of Y there exists a stable matching M containing the edge (m∗, w∗). Then,
there exists a guess (X,T ) such that Y ⊆ X and T (a) = M(a) for all a ∈ X. We claim
that for the instance constructed by the algorithm using this guess, the matching M is
stable, and therefore, the algorithm returns YES. Note that no agent from X can be
contained in a blocking pair, as they are all matched to their first choice. However, any
blocking pair containing no agent from X would also be a blocking pair for M in IY , and
therefore, no blocking pair exists.
We now turn to the Exact-Unique setting. Similar to the polynomial-time algorithm
for DeleteAcceptability , the XP-algorithm for Reorder uses the theory of rotations. We
start by making two straightforward observation:
Observation 2. To determine whether a stable matching M is the unique stable match-
ing, it is enough to know the rotation successors of all agents.
This observation gives rise to a simple algorithm to check whether a stable matching M
exposes a man-rotation. We create for each man m ∈ U a vertex vm and add a sink t. We
insert an arc from vm to vm′ ifM(m
′) ism’s rotation successor inM , i.e.,M(m′) = sM (m),
and an arc from vm to t ifm does not have a rotation successor. Then, checking whetherM
exposes a man-rotation reduces to checking whether there exists a cycle in the constructed
graph.
In the following, for an agent a ∈ A, we refer to her preferences induced by the set
of all agents she prefers to M(a) as the first part of her preferences and her preferences
over all agents to which she prefers M(a) the second part of her preferences. Using this
notation, we can make the following observation, which holds also if the roles of women
and men are switched:
Observation 3. To determine whether a stable matching M exposes a man-rotation, it
is enough to know the first part of the women’s preferences and the second part of the
men’s preferences.
The algorithm for Exact-Unique-Reorder starts by guessing the subset of
men XU ⊆ U and women XW ⊆ W of summed size ` whose preferences we reorder.
We immediately reject a guess if there exists a blocking pair (m,w) ∈ bp(M∗, I) such
that m /∈ XU and w /∈ XW , as in this case it is not possible to resolve this blocking
pair using the guessed agents. Moreover, for each m ∈ XU , we guess his rotation-
successor sReorderM∗ (m) ∈ W ∪ ∅ after the reorderings and for each w ∈ XW , we guess
her rotation successor sReorderW (w) ∈ U ∪ ∅. If there exists some m ∈ XU for which we
have guessed that sReorderM∗ (m) = ∅ and there exists some w ∈ W \ XW that prefers m
to M∗(w), then we reject the guess, as in this case if m ranks w above M∗(m), we create
a blocking pair and otherwise m has a rotation successor.
In the end, for all agents a ∈ XU ∪XW , we will reorder their preferences such that
their rotation successor is ranked directly after M∗(a) (if the rotation successor is ∅, then
we reorder the preferences of a by putting M∗(a) at the end of a’s preference list). By
Observation 3, as a’s rotation successor is already fixed, the only remaining task is to
decide which agents are in the first part of a’s preferences. Again, by Observation 3,
this can be solved for the men in XU and women in XW separately: Selecting the first
part of the preferences of w ∈ XW only influences the rotation successors of all men.
Similarly, selecting the first part of the preferences of m ∈ XU only influences whether
there exists a woman-rotation. Consequently, it is possible to split the problem into two
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parts. We describe how to determine the preferences of all w ∈ XW , thereby, resolving
all man-rotations. The woman-rotations can be resolved symmetrically.
To determine how to reorder the preferences of all w ∈ XW , we reduce the problem
to an instance of Spanning Anti-Arborescence. We construct the directed graph as
follows. For each pair (m,w) ∈M∗, we introduce a vertex vm. Moreover, we add a sink t.
Now, we add for each two vertices vm and vm′ an arc from vm to vm′ if we can reorder the
guessed agents’ preferences such that M∗(m′) is m’s rotation successor. For all m ∈ XU ,
we add an arc from vm to the vertex corresponding to the man matched to the guessed
rotation successor of m in M∗, i.e., vM∗(sReorder
M∗ (m))
.
For each m ∈ U \XU , we denote as s˜M∗(m) the most-preferred woman w ∈W \XW
which prefers m to M∗(w) and is ranked after M∗(m) by m. Now, for each w′ ∈ XW ,
which is ranked between M∗(m) and s˜M∗(m) in m’s preferences, we add an arc from vm
to vM∗(w′). Moreover, we add an arc from vm to vM∗(s˜M∗ (m)). It may happen that for
some m ∈ U \XU , s˜M∗(m) is undefined, as there does not exist such a woman. In this case,
we add an arc between vm and vM∗(w′) for each w
′ ∈ XW that m ranks below M∗(m) and
an arc from vm to t. We delete all arcs from vertices vm to vm′ if s
Reorder
W (M
∗(m′)) = m,
i.e., M∗(m′) cannot be the rotation successor of m, as we have guessed that M∗(m′)
ranks m below m′. We call the resulting graph HU and the graph constructed using the
same algorithm where the the roles of men and women are switched HW .
We compute an anti-arborescence in HU . In the anti-arborescence, for each vm, the
end point of its outgoing arc corresponds to the rotation successor of m in the modified
instance. To ensure this, we construct the preferences of all women w ∈ XW as follows.
For each w ∈ XW , we rank all men m ∈ U such that there is an arc from vm to vM∗(w)
in the anti-arborescence in an arbitrary order before M∗(w), while we place the guessed
man sReorderW (w) directly after M
∗(w) and add the remaining agents in an arbitrary order
after sReorderW (w).
We use the same procedure to determine the preferences of all m ∈ XU . Thereby, if
there exist anti-arborescences in HU and HW , we are able to reorder the preferences of the
guessed agents such that M∗ becomes the unique stable matching. Thus, we return YES
in this case. Otherwise, we continue with the next guess and return NO after rejecting
the last guess.
It remains to prove the correctness of the algorithm:
Lemma 11. If the algorithm returns YES, then there exists a solution to the given in-
stance of Exact-Unique-Reorder.
Proof. We now prove that for every pair (AU ,AW ) of anti-arborescences found in the
graphs HU and HW , the resulting reorderings of the preferences make M
∗ the unique
stable matching. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that this is not the case.
There are two possibilities, either M∗ is not a stable matching or M∗ is not the unique
stable matching.
First, we show that M∗ is stable. Since we rejected each guess containing a blocking
pair in (U \XU )×(W \XW ), each blocking pair involves at least one agent from XU ∪XW .
Fix a blocking pair (m,w). We assume without loss of generality that m ∈ XU . The
algorithm constructs the preferences of m such that m only prefers a woman w to M∗(m)
if the arc from vw to vM∗(m) is part of the anti-arborescence AW . However, such an
arc only exists in HW if w ranks m below M
∗(w), which implies that (m,w) cannot be
blocking.
Now we show that M∗ is the unique stable matching. To do so, we show that for
each man m with (vm, vM∗(w)) ∈ AU , the rotation successor of m is the women w. If AU
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contains the arc (vm, t), then m has no rotation successor. A symmetric statement also
holds for each woman. From this, the uniqueness of M∗ easily follows, as for any rotation
(without loss of generality a man-rotation) (mi0 , wj0), . . . , (mir−1 , wjr−1) exposed in M
∗,
the anti-arborescence AU contains the arcs (vmij , vmij+1 ) for all j ∈ [0, r−1], and therefore
contains a cycle, a contradiction to being an anti-arborescence.
So consider a man m with (vm, vM∗(w)) ∈ AU . By the definition of HU , the man m
prefers M∗(m) over w. We claim that every woman w′ ∈ W which m ranks be-
tween M∗(m) and w, it holds that w′ prefers M∗(w′) over m after the modifications.
If w′ ∈ XW , then we reorder the preferences of w′ in this way; otherwise, this follows
by the definition of HU . It remains to show that w prefers m to M
∗(w). If w ∈ XW ,
then we reordered the preferences of w such that w prefers m over M∗(w). Otherwise,
woman w prefers m over M∗(w) by the definition of HU . If (vm, t) ∈ AU , then analogous
arguments show that any woman w after M∗(m) in m’s preferences does not prefer m
over M∗(w).
Lemma 12. If the algorithm return NO, then there exists no solution to the given instance
of Exact-Unique-Reorder.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that the given instance of Exact-
Unique-Reorder admits a solution. We claim that from this it follows that there exists
a guess of XU ∪ XW and their rotation successors for which HU and HW both admit
anti-arborescences. This leads to a contradiction, thereby proving the lemma.
Assume that there exists a set YA ⊆ YU ∪ YW with YU ⊆ U and YW ⊆ W of `
agents and a reordering of the preferences of these agents such that M∗ is the unique
stable matching in the resulting instance. Let I ′ denote the manipulated instance and
let sI′M∗(m) denote the rotation successor of some m ∈ U in I ′ and sI
′
W (w) the rotation
successor of some w ∈ W . Then, there exists a guess where XU = YU , XW = YW , and
the guessed rotation successors of all m ∈ XU are sI′M∗(m), i.e., sReorderM∗ (m) = sI
′
M∗(m),
and of all w ∈ XU are sI′W (w). First of all note that the guess is not immediately rejected,
as for each blocking pair one of the involved agents needs to be part of XU ∪XW , and no
agent from XA without a rotation successor can be preferred by an unmodified agent of
opposite gender to her partner in M∗.
We describe how to construct an anti-arborescence AU for HU while the construction
for AW works analogously. For each m ∈ U , we include the arc (vm, vM∗(sI′
M∗ (m))
) in AU
and the arc (vm, t) if s
I′
M∗(m) = ∅. As there is no rotation exposed in M∗ in I ′, the
resulting graph AU is acyclic and every vertex but t has out-degree exactly 1, i.e., AU is
indeed an anti-arborescence.
It remains to show that AU is a subgraph of HU . Fix an arc (vm, vM∗(sI′
M∗ (m))
) ∈ AU
(where vM∗(∅) := t). For all m ∈ XU , this arc is contained in HU , as we have already
guessed sI′M∗(m) and added the arc (vm, vM∗(sI′
M∗ (m))
) to HU . For all m ∈ U \ XU , the
woman sI′M∗(m) needs to be ranked below M
∗(m) in m’s preferences. Moreover, by
definition, sI′M∗(m) is the first woman after M
∗(m) in m’s preferences which prefers m
over M∗(w). Thereby, w cannot be ranked after the first woman s˜M∗(m) ∈W \XW that
prefers m to M∗(s˜M∗(m)). Thus, if w is not s˜M∗(m), then w is contained in XW . In fact,
for all such women w there exists an arc from vm to vM∗(w) in HU .
Note that the developed algorithm runs in O(2`n2`+2) time, as we iterate over (2n` )
guesses for XA and for each of these guesses over O(n`) guesses for the rotation successors,
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and for each guess, the graphs and the anti-arborescence can be computed in O(n2). The
following proposition follows from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12:
Proposition 6. Exact-Unique-Reorder is solvable in O(2`n2`+2) time.
E Relationship between different manipulative actions
In this section, to get an overview of the different manipulative actions, we analyze how
they relate to each other. However, this section does not aim at introducing formal re-
lationships in the sense of a general notion of reducibility of two manipulative actions X
and Y such that if a computational problem for manipulative action X is computation-
ally hard, then the corresponding problem is also computationally hard for manipulative
action Y. Instead, we present high-level ideas how it is possible to simulate one action
with another action. We mainly aim at giving an intuition for the relationships between
the actions that helps the reader to understand, relate, and classify the results we present
in the paper.
Delete via Add. It is possible to model Delete actions by Add actions by adapting the
considered SM instance as follows. We keep all agents a ∈ A from the original instance
and introduce for each of them a new designated binding agent a′ of opposite gender with
arbitrary preferences. The set of agents that can be added to the instance are the binding
agents. We add a′ at the first position of the preferences of a, and the first choice of a′ is a.
Thereby, adding the binding agent a′ in the modified instance corresponds to deleting the
corresponding non-binding agent a in the original instance, as in this case the agent and
her binding agent are their mutual top-choices and thereby always matched in a stable
matching.
Restricted Swap via Swap. Before we describe how different manipulative actions can
be modeled by Swap actions, we first sketch how it is possible to model a variant of Swap
where one is only allowed to perform certain swaps and swapping the first and the second
element in the preference relation of an agent may have some specified non-unit cost. It
is possible to do so by introducing n(` + 1) dummy men and n(` + 1) dummy women
that all rank all respective dummy agents of the opposite gender before the other agents.
Thereby, regardless of which ` swaps are performed in the preferences of dummy agents,
in all stable matchings, all dummy agents are matched to dummy agents and a dummy
agent is never part of a blocking pair together with a non-dummy agent (see Lemma 4).
Now, for each preference list of a non-dummy agent a, if we want to restrict that the agent
a′ at rank i cannot be swapped with the agent a′′ at rank i+ 1, we place the `+ 1 dummy
agents with indices (i − 1)(` + 1) + 1 to i(` + 1) of opposite gender between a′ and a′′
in a’s preference list. Thereby, the given budget never suffices to swap the agents a′ and
a′′ in a’s preference list. Moreover, if we want to introduce a non-unit cost 2 ≤ c ≤ ` of
swapping the first and the second agent in some agent’s preference list, then we put the
dummy agents 1 to c− 1 of opposite gender between her most preferred and second-most
preferred agent in her preference list. We use this variant of Swap in the proof of 2 and
the second part of Theorem 2.
Add via Restricted Swap. It is possible to model Add actions by Swap actions by
modifying the given SM instance as follows. First of all, we keep all agents a ∈ A from
the original instance. Second, we introduce for each agent a ∈ A \A′, one agent a′ of the
opposite gender and one agent a′′ of the same gender with preferences a′ : a  a′′ and
a′′ : a′. Moreover, we put for each a ∈ A\A′, the agent a′ as her top-choice. All preference
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Figure 5: Gadget to model DeleteAcceptability by Swap.
lists are arbitrarily completed. Now, we introduce dummy agents such that the only
allowed swaps are swapping a with a′′ in a′’s preference list for some a ∈ A\A′. Not adding
an agent a ∈ A \A′ corresponds to leaving the preferences of a′ unchanged, which results
in (a′, a) being part of every stable matching. Adding an agent a ∈ A \ A′ corresponds
to modifying the preferences of a′ by swapping a and a′′, which results in (a′, a′′) being
part of every stable matching. Thereby, a is now able to pair up with other agents from
the original instance. We use this reduction in the proof of the second part of Theorem 2
and prove its correctness in Lemma 5.
Reorder via Restricted Swap. It is possible to model reorder actions by Swap actions.
To do so, we construct a new SM instance from a given instance. First of all, we keep
all agents a ∈ A. Moreover, for each agent a ∈ A, we introduce a copy a′ as well as a
binding agent a˜ of opposite gender to the corresponding instance. We adjust the budget
to `′ = ` · (4n2 + 2n). We modify the preferences of agents a and a′ by inserting a˜ as their
top-choice and for each agent a′′ of the opposite gender, we insert the copy a′ directly
after the agent a. Moreover, the preferences of a˜ are a˜ : a′  a. We only allow to swap
the first two agents in the preferences of a˜ at cost 4n2 and to swap all agents except a˜
in the preferences of a′. The general idea of the construction is that only one of a and a′
can be free to pair up with a non-binding agent, as depending on the performed swaps
the other is matched to the corresponding binding agent in all stable matchings. We
cannot change the preferences of a at all, while we can change the preferences of a′ at
cost 2n arbitrarily (except her top-choice). Initially, a′ is always matched to the binding
agent and can be made free at cost 4n2. Reordering the preferences of an agent a in the
original instance then corresponds to making a′ free by modifying the preferences of a˜
and reordering the preferences of a′ arbitrarily (except her top-choice which is irrelevant
in this case). Overall, we can make at most ` agents a′ free, while for each of them we
can fully reorder the relevant part of their preferences. We use a similar construction in
the proof of Proposition 2.
DeleteAcceptability via Restricted Swap. It is possible to model deleting the ac-
ceptability of two agents by performing swaps. To do so, it is necessary to modify the
given SM instance by introducing for each man-woman pair (m,w) ∈ U ×W where m
ranks w at position i and w ranks m at position j the gadget depicted in Figure 5. More-
over, we modify the instance such that only men m′ are allowed to swap w and wt in their
preferences (as indicated in Figure 5). Matching m with w in the original instance corre-
sponds to matching m with w′ and m′ with w in the modified instance. Note that it is
never possible that only one of (m,w′) and (m′, w) is part of a stable matching. Deleting
the acceptability of a pair (m,w) corresponds to swapping w and wt in m
′’s preference
relation, as in this case neither (m,w′) nor (m′, w) can be part of any stable matching.
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All in all, it is possible to conclude that performing swaps is, in some sense, the
most powerful manipulative action considered, as all other actions can be modeled using
this manipulative action. However, this does not imply that if a computational problem
considered here is hard for some manipulative action, then it is also hard for Swap, as,
for example, for the Exact-Exists setting a modified problem definition is used for the
manipulative actions Add and Delete.
F Preliminary Experiments
We conducted some preliminary experiments to develop an understanding for the effec-
tiveness of the considered manipulative actions in different settings. To do so, we im-
plemented our polynomial-time algorithms for Constructive-Exists-Delete, Exact-
Exists-Swap, Exact-Exists-Reorder, and Exact-Exists-DeleteAcceptability.
We run them on several SM instances with a randomly chosen goal, i.e., a uniformly
at random chosen man-woman pair or a uniformly at random chosen complete match-
ing, and calculated the number of manipulative actions needed to achieve it. We used
three different methods to generate SM instances: In the uniform method, the pref-
erence list of each agent is drawn uniformly at random from the set of all preference
lists. In the master method, we assume that every agent has an underlying score,
i.e., score(wi) = score(mi) = i,∀i ∈ [n]. To generate the preferences of an agent, she
adds to the underlying score of every possible partner some noise drawn from the Gaus-
sian 0.35 · n · N (0, 1) and sorts the agents by their score to obtain her preference list. In
the dating method, we use some real-world speed dating data [7]. In each of the seven-
teen instances between 18 and 44 students had a date of five minutes with each student
of opposite gender and after each date evaluated him or her on six different attributes.
Moreover, the students assigned a weight to each of the six attributes reflecting their
importance. To obtain the preferences of an agent, we calculated for all possible partners
the weighted sum of the assigned attribute scores and subsequently sorted the partners
by their overall score. To obtain instances with n men and n women from the dataset,
we randomly deleted from all bigger instances agents until the specified size is met.
In the Constructive-Exists setting (see Figures 6 to 8 in Appendix F.1), we observed
that in the speed dating instances for more than half of all possible pairs deleting around
one seventh and for more than 75% of pairs deleting around one fifth of the agents suffices
to ensure that this pair is part of a stable matching. The master model produces quite
similar results, whereas in the uniform model slightly less deletions are needed. Using
the master and uniform model, we also generated instances including up to 200 agents.
With a growing number of agents, the median and average percentage of agents that need
to be deleted steadily decreases for both models to around 6%. Overall, it seems that
Delete operations are surprisingly powerful in the Constructive-Exists setting, as for most
pairs deleting a moderately low number of agents suffices to include the designated pair
in some stable matching. This suggests that in practice instances might be vulnerable to
a manipulator that is able to delete agents from the market and is also able to influence
the selected stable matching.
In the Exact-Exists setting (see Figures 9 to 11 in Appendix F.2), the number of
Swap, Reorder, and DeleteAcceptability operations necessary to achieve a given goal is
close to Gaussian distributed for all three models. For all manipulative actions, all three
models perform pretty comparable in this setting; especially, the uniform and dating
model produce nearly identical results. For Swap, the mean number of swaps needed
is around 0.35n2 where the factor 0.35 slightly increases when the number of agents is
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increased, while the standard deviation lies around 0.08n2 and slightly decreases. For
DeleteAcceptability , on average, the acceptability of around 0.23n2 pairs needs to be
deleted with a standard deviation around 0.06n2, while for Reorder, the average number
of agent grows from slightly above 0.7n for n = 10 to around 0.92n for n = 100 and
the standard deviation decreases from 0.1n to around 0.04n. All in all, the Exact-Exists
setting seems to be rather demanding in the sense that for a randomly drawn complete
matching the given instance needs to be significantly changed to make this matching
stable. It is especially surprising that for the powerful action Reorder on average close
to half of the agents need to be modified—note that there always exists a trivial solution
where the preferences of all agents from one gender are reordered.
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F.1 Constructive-Exists
(a) Distribution of number of deleted agents for instances with
fifteen men and fifteen women generated using all three models.
(b) Distribution of number of deleted agents
for instances with 15/25/50/100 men and
15/25/50/100 women generated using the
uniform model.
(c) Distribution of number of deleted agents
for instances with 15/25/50/100 men and
15/25/50/100 women generated using the
master model.
Figure 6: Distribution of number of deleted agents.
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(a) Uniform model (b) Master model
(c) Dating model
Figure 7: Median, mean, mode (data point with the highest frequency), and third quartile
(data point such that 75% of the data lies below this point) of number of deleted agents
for instances of size between ten and twenty.
(a) Uniform model (b) Master model
Figure 8: Median, mean, mode, and third quartile of percentage of deleted agents for
instances of size between ten and one-hundred.
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F.2 Exact-Exists
Figure 9: Distribution of number of Swap (top), DeleteAcceptability (middle), and Re-
order (bottom) operations needed to make a uniformly at random chosen complete match-
ing stable for instances with fifteen men and fifteen women for all three models.
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(a) Mean and standard deviation of number of
swaps divided by the summed length of all
preference lists for instances with between ten
and twenty men and women.
(b) Mean and standard deviation of number of
deleted acceptabilities divided by the summed
length of all preference lists for instances with
between ten and twenty men and women.
(c) Mean and standard deviation of percentage
of reordered agents for instances with between
ten and twenty men and women.
Figure 10: Mean and standard deviation of number of Swap, Reorder, DeleteAcceptability
actions needed in the Exact-Exists setting for all three models.
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(a) Mean and standard deviation of number of
swaps divided by the summed length of all
preference lists for instances with between ten
and one-hundred men and women.
(b) Mean and standard deviation of number of
deleted acceptabilities divided by the summed
length of all preference lists for instances with
between ten and one-hundred men and women.
(c) Mean and standard deviation of percentage
of reordered agents for instances with between
ten and one-hundred men and women.
Figure 11: Mean and standard deviation of number of Swap, Reorder, DeleteAcceptability
actions needed in the Exact-Exists setting for master and uniform model.
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